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ABSTRACT
Ju, Jiayan, M. A., May 1998 Geography
Regional Economic Policy and Regional Income Inequality in 
the People's Republic of China (105 pp.)
This study is a descriptive analysis of regional 
development policies and their spatial outcomes in the 
People's Republic of China. It traces the history of 
China's regional economic development, and investigates 
regional income inequality in China by examining empirical 
evidence.
Two distinctive regional economic policies are identified 
associated with two time periods in history. The pro­
interior regional economic policy pursued in the pre-reform 
era (1949-1978) emphasized regional equality over economic 
efficiency, and diverted massive amounts of industrial 
investment to the interior provinces from the more 
developed coastal region. The pro-coast regional economic 
policy of the reform era (after 1978), on the contrary, 
gave priority to economic efficiency over regional 
equality, and concentrated state industrial investment in 
the coastal provinces.
An examination of empirical evidence indicates that the 
pro-interior regional economic policy did not bring about 
improvements in provincial income inequality. Both 
absolute and relative measures of provincial income 
inequality increased during the pre-reform era. 
Surprisingly, provincial income inequality decreased in the 
early reform era until the early 1990s as a result of rapid 
growth of the previously less developed provinces in the 
coastal region and slow growth of the industrially more 
developed provinces. However, a widening of regional 
income gap is inevitable given the pro-coast regional 
economic policy and it will remain a long-term phenomenon 
in China.
Director: Evan Denney
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
In 1949 the government of the People's Republic of 
China inherited an economy in which most of the economically 
developed areas were concentrated on the eastern coast and 
in large cities. This pattern of uneven regional 
development was incompatible with the socialist ideology of 
equality among people, classes and regions. The Chinese 
leadership took it upon themselves to eliminate the three 
big differences: the difference between industrial workers 
and peasants; the difference between urban and rural areas; 
and the difference between manual and mental work. In order 
to reduce regional economic inequalities, the Chinese 
government devised a new regional economic policy that 
diverted resources from the coast to the interior. During 
the First Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957), two-thirds of the 
major industrial projects and more than one-half of total
1
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industrial investment were located in the interior (Kirkby 
1985, 138) .
The Vietnam War and the worsening relationships with 
the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1960s made the 
Chinese government extremely sensitive to the possibility of 
a "Third World War". National defense emerged as a priority 
in China’s regional economic policy. Avoiding the 
vulnerable large coastal cities (First Front) and their 
adjacent areas (Second Front), the construction of Third 
Front projects in remote sites of China was carried out from 
the early 1960s and to the mid-1970s. Investment was 
diverted to the construction of industries, especially large 
capital projects such as iron and steel and military 
machinery, in interior locations that were less vulnerable 
to foreign attacks. These Third Front industrial projects 
tended to be located in "shan, san, dong" sites, which means 
"in mountains, in dispersion, in caves".
Thus, regional economic policy during the three decades 
after Liberation in 1949 was largely driven by egalitarian 
ideology and defense concern. Whether the policy decreased 
regional inequalities of economic development is 
controversial. Some studies conclude that the pattern of 
uneven regional economic development, caused by the 
establishment of the treaty ports at the end of the Qing
3
Dynasty, was completely corrected by the end of the three 
decades after Liberation (Li 1992, 50, 53). Other studies 
argue that uneven regional economic development did not 
change significantly during this period despite spatially 
biased investment policy. Some decline in interprovincial 
inequalities occurred during the 1960s (Lardy 1980; Riskin 
1987), but this trend did not continue. Substantial inter­
provincial inequalities remained in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Paine 1981; Lyons 1991; Tsui 1991).
Regional economic development policy during Mao 
Zedong's time seems to have achieved some degree of regional 
economic equality although at the expense of efficiency 
(Yang 1990, 240). After thirty years of biased regional 
economic policy, the coastal region still produced about 60 
percent of China's industrial output (Zen and Liang 1994,
16). The failure of this regional economic policy in 
bringing about national economic growth has been widely 
criticized (Zhang 1989, 71), especially the Third Front 
program. According to Barry Naughton, China's industrial 
output is 10 to 15 percent below what it would have been if 
the Third Front program had never been undertaken (Naughton 
1988, 379).
Since the rise of China's paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping at the end of 1978, and with the introduction of
4
the reform and open-door policy, fundamental changes have 
occurred in China's regional economic development philosophy 
and policy. The new regional economic development policy, 
emphasizing efficiency over equality, has encouraged 
economic growth in coastal regions, expected and tolerated 
uneven regional economic development in the hope that growth 
would eventually diffuse to the interior.
Western regional economic development theories have 
greatly influenced the development philosophy of the reform 
era. These include the notion of Cumulative-Circular 
Causation (Myrdal 1957), Growth Pole Theory (Hirschman 1958, 
183-201), the Inverted-U Model (Williamson 1965), and the 
Core-Periphery Model (Friedmann 1966, 60-101). These models 
are discussed in Chapter Two.
The Three-Economic-Region Model was the blueprint for 
Chinese regional economic policy during the 1980s (Figure 
1). The sixth Five-Year-Plan (1981-1985) first proposed the 
division of the country into three large regions for 
purposes of economic development, namely, the Eastern, 
Central, and Western Regions. The Seventh Five-Year-Plan 
(1986-1990) officially adopted this model. The model is 
based on the concepts of comparative advantage and regional 
division of labor: the Eastern region would specialize in 
export-oriented industries and foreign trade; the Central
EASTERN
Heilongjiang
CENTRAL 
REGION Beijins
Xinjiang
Inner Mongolia
Nmgxia
wTianjm
Hebei
WESTERN
REGION Shandong
Qinghai Jiangsu
Gansu
Shaanxi \  Henan
Shanghai
Anhui
Sichuan Zhejiang
Jiangxi
Hunan
Gui2hou
Yunnan GuartgdonGuangxi 
0
REGION
□ Fourteen open coastal cities 
A Special economic zones
Various open economic zones: 
the golden coastline
Hainan
Figure 1. The three economic regions, open coastal cities, and open economic zones of China. Source: Fan 1997,624,
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Region in agriculture and energy; and the Western Region in 
animal husbandry and mineral exploitation (Beijing Review 
1986a; 1986b). Foreign trade and industrialization in the 
Eastern Region is expected to initiate national economic 
growth, and this growth is expected to diffuse to the 
Central and Western Regions given time. Yet the mechanisms 
for bringing about diffusion have hardly been discussed in 
the literature.
The Ladder-Step Theory has been an important guide for 
regional economic policy makers in the reform era. This 
theory gives the Eastern Region priority of development.
It maintains that, over time, economic growth will diffuse 
from the coast to the interior in a way like descending the 
steps of a ladder (Yang 1990, 244-246).
Export-led growth in the Eastern Region has been 
greatly facilitated by the establishment of various open 
zones along the coast (Figure 1). These include the five 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
and Xiamen designated in 1979, and Hainan in 1988. In 
addition, fourteen Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) were 
designated in 1984. Various other open zones were selected 
including the three Coastal Economic Development Zones 
(CEDZS) of the Yangtze, Pearl, and Min River deltas. These
7
open zones enjoy various preferential policies from the 
state, and foreign investors were given special treatment, 
such as, tax exemptions, and import duty reductions. To 
promote these zones, the state allocated large investments 
to improve their infrastructure. As state and foreign 
investments boosted economic growth, these zones became 
China's "golden coastline", a popular term that first 
appeared in People's Daily, overseas edition, dated Jan.
22, 1992.
Given the regional economic policy of the reform era 
and the regional economic development theories on which it 
is based, one would expect an increase in regional economic 
inequalities in China. There seems to be a consensus of 
opinion that regional economic inequalities decreased 
during the thirty years after Liberation in 1949, and that 
they have been increasing since the implementation of the 
reform and open-door policy at the end of 1978. Yet 
empirical studies regarding regional economic inequalities 
in China have reported mixed results. Some studies report 
a decline (Yang 1992; Zen and Liang 1994), others an 
increase (Chen et al. 1993).
The issue of regional economic inequalities in China 
is a complicated one. The above consensus is over
simplistic. The extent of regional economic inequalities 
depends on which regional unit is examined. Regional 
economic inequalities could be the disparities between the 
three economic regions, between the provinces, or between 
the counties within a province. Most studies agree that 
since reform there has been a widening of development gap 
between the coast and the interior. But when it comes down 
to provincial or county level, the story is more complex 
and worth our attention.
Statement of Purpose and Methodology
The primary goal of this study is to examine some 
aspects of the regional economic development in China since 
1949. This study utilizes an extensive library search for 
literature in both English and Chinese. Much of the 
research focuses on regional economic development 
literature and, to a significant extent, on regional 
economic development models. One of the difficulties in 
studying aspects of China is acquisition of data. This 
necessitated substantial use of the interlibrary loan 
opportunities at the University of Montana.
Chinese studies in general often lack a regional 
dimension. Though regional economic policy is only one
9
component in the package for China's national development, 
its importance has not always been appreciated. There are 
fifty-six ethnic groups in China, and most of the minority 
groups live in the poorer interior regions. Regional 
economic policy must cater to a variety of ethnic and 
interest groups so as not to cause social instability and 
conflicts between regions, a prerequisite for a healthy 
national economy.
In the course of a nation's economic development, 
there seem to be tradeoffs between growth and equality. In 
China's case, there has long been a set of conflicts over 
regional economic policy. The controversial question is: 
should there be regional economic specialization based on 
comparative advantage, which would allow faster economic 
growth in the more efficient coastal region, or, should 
there be a more equitable regional economic policy even if 
it is not as efficient?
In order to answer this question, an examination of 
China's regional development history is indispensable.
From the time the People's Republic of China was founded to 
the current day, two distinctive regional policies can be 
identified. They are associated with two time periods in 
history. In this study the two time periods are called the
10
"pre-reform era" (1949-1978) and the "reform era" (after 
1978), with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his reform policy 
in 1978 as the demarcation line. Emphasizing 
egalitarianism and national defense, the pro-interior 
regional economic policy pursued in the pre-reform era 
diverted massive flows of industrial investment to the 
interior provinces from the more developed coastal regions. 
The pro-coast regional economic policy of the reform era, 
however, concentrated state industrial investment in the 
coastal provinces, placing more importance on efficiency 
than on equality.
To evaluate spatial impacts of the above two policies, 
a collection and review of empirical evidence is a critical 
next step. The questions that have to be answered at this 
stage of the research are: 1) Did the pro-interior regional 
economic policy of the pre-reform era succeed in narrowing 
regional economic inequalities? 2) Has the pro-coast 
regional economic policy of the reform era increased 
regional economic inequalities? The absence of evidence 
showing significant reduction in regional inequalities in 
the pre-reform era would discredit the pro-interior 
regional economic policy, and the presence of such evidence 
would give credit to the policy. An increase in regional
11
economic inequalities in the reform era was expected. An 
examination of empirical evidence will suggest if reality 
corresponds with the expectation.
To summarize, this research is a descriptive analysis 
of regional economic development policies and their spatial 
outcomes in the People's Republic of China since 1949. It 
traces the history of regional economic development in 
China, and analyzes the spatial impacts of Chinese regional 
economic policies by examining empirical evidence. As a 
citizen of China, I hope to provide the reader with a 
treatise regarding China's regional economic development 
and planning, so as to assist in a better understanding of 
the most populous nation in the world.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theories of Regional Economic Development 
The 1960s saw a proliferation of regional development 
theories in the West, some of which served as theoretical 
justification for the regional economic development 
philosophy of the reform era. These include the notion of 
Circular and Cumulative Causation (Myrdal 1957), Growth Pole 
Theory (Hirschman 1958, 183-201) , the Inverted-U Model 
(Williamson 1965), and the Center-Periphery Model (Friedmann 
1966, 60-101).
The birth of regional development as a field of study 
is often dated as 1958, corresponding with the publication 
of Gunnar Myrdal's Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions in 1957, and Albert Hirschman's The Strategy of 
Economic Development in 1958 (Malecki 1991, 25).
Gunnar Myrdal's (Myrdal 1957) Circular and Cumulative 
Causation Model is a model of unbalanced growth. It
12
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suggests that if a region gains some initial economic 
advantage, new growth and the benefits of multiplier effects 
will tend to concentrate in this already expanding region, 
rather than in other regions. Growth becomes self­
reinforcing with strong endogenous forces tending to 
increase regional differentials in productivity growth, 
which may persist for a long time. Regarding the spread 
effects (the ability of the expanding region to radiate its 
growth outward into the surrounding space), Myrdal thinks 
that "the higher the level of economic development that a 
country has already attained the stronger the spread effects 
will usually be (Myrdal 1957, 34)".
The modern development of the Growth Pole Theory is 
attributed to a French economist, F. Perroux, who believed 
that "growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it 
appears in points or development poles, with variable 
intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and with 
varying terminal effects to the whole of the economy 
(Glasson 1975, 145)". J. Boudeville, another French 
economist, defines a regional growth pole as a "set of 
expanding industries located in an urban area and inducing 
further development of economic activity throughout its zone 
of influence (Glasson 1975, 145). Albert Hirschman 
(Hirschman 1958), Gunnar Myrdal (Myrdal 1957), and Harry
14
Richardson (Richardson 197 6) further refined and developed 
the basic concepts of Growth Pole Theory.
Albert Hirschman believes that development often begins 
with the sudden, vigorous, and nearly spontaneous growth of 
one or a few regions or urban centers. Therefore, "whatever 
the reason, there can be little doubt that an economy, to 
lift itself to higher income levels, must and will first
develop within itself one or several regional centers of
economic strength" (Hirschman 1958, 183).
Regarding the interplay of polarization effects (the 
ability of leading industries to attract other economic 
units into the growth pole) and spread effects, Hirschman 
contends that if the pole region had to rely to an important 
degree on products from the peripheral region for its own 
expansion, the trickling-down or spread effects would gain 
the upper hand over the polarization effects. But if the
functioning of market forces results in a temporary victory
of the polarization effects, deliberate economic policy will 
be employed to correct the situation. He believes that 
economic policy should be an important influence throughout 
the process of regional economic development.
Hirschman suggests a strategy of phasing the investment 
process over regions, concentrating initially upon the 
points of rapid urban-industrial expansion, and then moving
15
outward into the periphery. Although public investment 
policy may cause substantial regional disparity at one 
stage, such a situation will not persist in the long run 
because of government's concern over equality and national 
cohesion.
Jeffrey Williamson's Inverted-U Model (Williamson 1965) 
describes an expected pattern of regional economic growth 
with an initial divergence followed by convergence during 
the course of economic development. He presents a 
hypothesis that the early stages of national development 
would generate increasingly large regional income 
differentials. Somewhere during the course of development, 
some or all of the disequilibrating tendencies diminish, 
causing a reversal in the pattern of interregional 
inequality, with the backward regions closing the 
development gap between themselves and the already 
industrialized areas. According to Williamson, "the 
expected result is that a statistic describing regional 
inequality will trace out an inverted 'U' over the national 
growth path; the historical timing of the peak level of 
spatial income differentials is left somewhat vague and may 
vary considerably with the resource endowment and 
institutional environment of each developing nation 
(Williamson 1965, 10)." Based on his empirical study, he
16
concludes that "rising regional income disparities and 
increasing North-South dualism [the coexistence of wealthy 
and poor regions in a country, with North being wealthy 
regions, and South poor regions] is typical of early 
development stages, while regional convergence and a 
disappearance of severe North-South problems is typical of 
the more mature stages of national growth and development 
(Williamson 1965, 64)".
The spatial structure of economies that are in 
transition to industrialism is best described by a Center- 
Periphery Model. John Friedmann states that "a powerful 
central region reduces the rest of the space economy to the 
role of a tributary area that is drained of its resources, 
manpower, and capital (Friedmann 1966, 99)." The Center- 
Periphery Model is a spatial disequilibrium model.
According to Friedmann, "this disequilibrium is a structural 
one. As a result, the automatic working of the market does 
not reestablish a spatial equilibrium but reinforces the 
initial structural imbalance. Even when equilibrating 
tendencies persist, a balanced interregional system may 
require several generations to come into existence 
(Friedmann 1966, 99)." Friedmann contends that a continuing 
center-periphery relation is harmful to a country, and that 
regional economic policy seeks to influence economic
17
activity by guiding public investments. Core regions 
perform a critical role in generating impulses of economic 
development and transmitting them to the periphery of the 
space economy. According to Friedmann, "national economic 
development is, to a large extent, identical with the 
development of core regions. From one fourth to one third 
of national investment may be spent there, and for good 
reason. For core regions perform a critical role in the 
process of industrialization and are major centers for 
trade, finance, and government activities (Friedmann 1966,
66) ."
The above four development theories all agree to the 
following: 1) Growth begins in a few growth poles or growth 
centers. 2) At the early stages of development, polarization 
effects are stronger than spread effects because of the 
benefit of an agglomeration economy, which causes regional 
income inequality to rise. 3) In the long run, growth will 
spread from the center to the periphery, reducing regional 
income disparity. 4) Regional economic policy influences 
regional economic development by guiding public investment.
The above, so-called "stages-of-development" models, 
greatly influenced regional economic development policy of 
the reform era. From the standpoint of these models, China, 
being a developing country, is at an early stage in the
18
economic development process. Therefore, an increase in 
regional economic inequalities is inevitable in the short 
term. These models served to legitimize the new Chinese 
regional economic policy aimed at achieving efficiency at 
the expense of equality through national investment in 
state-selected growth poles along the coast of China. Based 
on these models as well as classical theories of economic 
development, China's new regional economic policy emphasized 
comparative advantage, regional specialization, and division 
of labor. As a result, a variety of new regional economic 
development models emerged. Two new models of Chinese 
regional economic development, the Three-Economic-Region 
Model, and the Ladder-Step Theory, will be discussed in 
Chapter Four.
Previous Studies 
There is a large body of literature regarding regional 
economic development in China. For Chinese studies in 
general, it is said that one should look for archival 
sources in the West, do field work in China, receive 
language training in Taiwan, and enjoy research 
opportunities in Hong Kong. The following literature review 
is from both Western (American and British) and Chinese 
(mainland and Hong Kong) sources. It is reviewed in the
19
alphabetic order of the authors' last names.
Kam Wing Chan (Chan 1992) studies the urbanization 
policies of the pre-reform era. He finds that China was 
highly effective in simultaneously fostering rapid 
industrial growth and slowing urban growth. This "anti­
urbanism" or "industrialization without urbanization" was 
achieved through mass urban population removal to the 
countryside, strict bans on urban in-migration, suppression 
of the expansion of urban service employment and personal 
consumption in general, and promotion of rural 
industrialization. These "anti-urban" measures were seen as 
the logical results of Mao Zedong's scheme to promote 
greater rural-urban balance. Yet according to Chan, most of 
these measures are arguably "urban-biased" and they tend to 
reinforce urban-rural disparities and protect existing 
privileges of the urbanites.
Cindy Fan (Fan 1995b) describes and analyzes the 
patterns of and changes in uneven regional development at 
three different regional levels: a study of interprovincial 
income inequality, a study of intraprovincial inequality for 
five provinces, and a detailed case study of Guangdong 
Province. She concludes that the reduction in 
interprovincial income inequality in China since 1978 is the 
result of rapid growth in previously less developed eastern
20
provinces (Guangdong and Fujian), and slow growth in 
previously more developed regions (the three municipalities 
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and the three 
northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and 
Liaoning). She also points out that interprovincial 
analysis is not adequate for explaining uneven regional 
economic development in China. At the county level, the 
story is more complex. Her case study of five provinces 
provides some evidence of the diffusion of growth from 
Shanghai to neighboring areas, while Guangdong moved in the 
direction of growth polarization.
Her other paper (Fan 1995a) offers an explanation for 
Guangdong Province's growth polarization in comparison with 
a more balanced growth pattern in Jiangsu Province. Her 
empirical analysis of the data for the 1980s indicate that 
spatial income inequality in Jiangsu Province has declined 
a.s a result of local investment in township and village 
enterprises. This is called development from below (DFB). 
Guangdong, on the other hand, has seen an escalation of 
spatial income inequality and a concentration of economic 
growth in the Pearl River Delta area, which is strongly 
related to state investment and foreign investment. This is 
called development from above and development from outside 
(DFA and DFO). These findings support her hypothesis that
21
DFA and DFO tend to increase spatial income inequality, 
while DFB is accompanied by a more balanced spatial economic 
development pattern.
Nicholas Lardy's work (Lardy 1980) was the first to 
provide a detailed and systematic account of China's 
regional economic inequalities. He concludes that regional 
income inequality was reduced over time during the pre­
reform era. He calculated population-weighted coefficients 
of variation for 1952, 1957 and 1974 based on industrial 
output data. His index shows a declining trend over time.
Li Si-Ming (Li 1996) explains why there is a 
fundamental paradox in China's regional economic development 
in the reform era. At the provincial level, regional income 
gaps surprisingly narrowed in the 1980s when the pro-coast 
regional economic policy was implemented. One explanation 
Li offers for the existence of this paradox is the relative 
slow growth of the thtee municipalities and the three 
northeastern provinces and the rapid growth of originally 
less developed Eastern provinces.
Li Wen-Yan (Li 1990) points out that the Great Leap 
Forward (explained in Chapter 3) from 1958 to 1960 and the 
Third Front construction from the early 19 60s through the 
mid-197 0s had serious negative effects despite some positive 
results. According to Li, "neither nationwide high growth
22
rate nor a more even spatial distribution of heavy industry 
was realized (Li 1990, 6 3 ) The Third Front program "did 
to some extent promote the economic development of the 
inland provinces but the result was not as large as expected 
and was gained at the expense of nationwide economic growth 
(Li 1990, 63)
Li Zhengquan (Li 1992) holds an orthodox Chinese 
opinion that the first thirty years of China's development 
resulted in a more evenly spread industrial distribution.
Yet he criticizes the Third Front program, and admits that 
equality was achieved at the expense of efficiency.
Thomas Lyons (Lyons 1991) examines regional economic 
growth and interregional economic disparities in China from 
1952 to 1987, and finds that every province experienced 
substantial real growth over this period. The provinces, 
however, differed quite widely in terms of overall growth 
rates and rates of industrialization. According to Lyons, 
"in general, the less-developed provinces did not narrow the 
absolute gaps between themselves and those that were ahead 
in the 1950s (Lyons 1991, 498)." He concludes that "China's 
experience since the 1950s has been quite respectable; at 
least in term of regional disparities, it does not 
constitute a clear triumph of inequality (Lyons 1991, 499)." 
However, the absolute gaps between richest and poorest
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provinces widened considerably between the 1950s and the 
mid-1980s.
Barry Naughton (Naughton 1988) describes the origin, 
development and legacy of the Third Front program. He 
argues that the Third Front greatly increased the costs of 
industrialization by shifting construction to substantially 
more remote locations in the interior. According to 
Naughton, "China's annual industrial output is currently 10- 
15 percent below what it would have been if the Third Front 
had never been undertaken, and that investment had been used 
in other inland locations (Naughton 1988, 379)." Moreover, 
the Third Front reduced the efficiency of investment in 
First and Second Front areas as well, which added to its 
cost.
Suzanne Paine (Paine 1981) studies the time period from 
1949 to 1979, and finds that certain key spatial 
inequalities in China have narrowed over this period as a 
whole, although progress has been uneven.
Carl Riskin (Riskin 1987) looks into income 
distribution from 1957 to 1979 at five scales: 
interregional, inter-local, urban-rural, personal and inter­
class. Regarding interregional income disparity, he finds 
that all of the relative measures of inequality (for 
example, the coefficient of variation) were either declining
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over the period or at least remaining constant. The 
absolute difference in yuan (Chinese currency) between the 
highest and the lowest per capita provincial industrial 
output widened considerably from 1957 to 1979. Based on 
different findings at different scales, he concludes that no 
simple conclusion about the degree of equality achieved can 
be drawn. According to Riskin, "perhaps the least 
complicated and most significant general conclusion" is 
"that China's poor emerged from the Maoist era significantly 
better off than the poor of most other developing countries.
But poverty remained...(Riskin 1987,250)."
Kai Yuen Tsui (Tsui 1991) explores the change in 
regional economic inequality in China from 1952 to 1985.
His empirical study suggests that interprovincial income 
gaps did not narrow between 1952 and 1985. Regional income 
inequality definitely increased since 1970 because the 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor provinces 
by the central government was not significant enough to 
reduce inequality over the long run.
Yang Dali (Yang 1990) compares and contrasts China's 
approaches to regional industrial development in the pre­
reform era and reform era. Yang argues that the pre-reform 
regional policies combined features of a Soviet-style 
development strategy with Mao's ideas of egalitarianism and
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self-reliance, but "ended in the worst of both worlds (Yang 
1990, 240)." These policies seem to have achieved some 
degree of regional equality, albeit at the expense of 
efficiency, because the national economy would have grown 
faster if investment had been made in terms of efficiency.
In the reform era, the central government has favored the 
coastal region through state investment and preferential 
policies. Since efficiency was emphasized over equality in 
the reform era, "regional growth has been and will continue 
to be uneven and the gap between the regions will perhaps 
widen at an accelerating rate (Yang 1990, 250)."
Zen Juxing and Liang Bin (Zen and Liang 1994) argue 
that the regional development process in China does not 
follow Williamson's Inverted-U Model. Instead, an "M" model 
and a "W" model are suggested for interprovincial income 
disparity and the disparity between the three economic 
regions respectively. Zen and Liang predict that regional 
gap in economic development will continue to enlarge in the 
future.
Zhang Shuguang (Zhang 1993) points out that regional 
income inequalities measured by Net Material Product (NMP) 
and by National Income Utilized (NIU) tell different 
stories. NMP refers to the nominal gross value of output 
minus nominal material consumption, and NIU is the sum of
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public and private consumption plus saving. The difference 
between the two may be regarded as government transfers, 
which, for example, would normally be negative for Shanghai, 
reflecting a net outflow of resources, and positive for 
Tibet, reflecting a net inflow of resources. During 1952- 
1978, regional income inequality measured by NIU per capita 
was apparently decreasing, while that measured by NMP per 
capita was increasing, reflecting an increasing gap in 
regional production efficiency. During 1979-1990, however, 
the central government limited its role in income 
redistribution. As a result, regional income disparity 
measured by NMP decreased between provinces and the three 
economic regions, while that measured by NIU obviously 
increased, suggesting an enlarging regional income gap.
CHAPTER THREE.
PRE-REFORM ERA,. 1949-1978
A Command Economy 
The Chinese economic system in the pre-reform., era 
(1949-1978) was a- variant of the- Soviet-style command 
economy-.- Command- economies share- two- basic characteristics.- 
First,, resource allocation decisions are made in response to 
commands from- central planners- rather than- in response to 
markets.- Second-,- a- large- volume- of resources- is 
concentrated- in the hands- of central planners-,- who 
redistribute resources into selected investment programs 
(Naughton 1996,- 26-) -.- Command economies are-also- called- 
centrally- planned- economies.
The- Chinese command- economy was not- an identical twin- 
of the Soviet command economy. In fact, China did not 
follow-the Soviet model- closely-except- for- the First F-i-v-e- 
Year-Plan (1953-1957). . China and the Soviet Union had 
different factor endowments. In addi tion,- China-had -a much -
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larger rural population, and was much poorer than the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, the Chinese planning system was less 
centralized than that of the Soviet Union.
The development strategy of the Chinese command economy 
was designed to achieve maximum growth of industrial and 
military capacity as rapidly as possible. A massive flow of 
investment was directed into capital-intensive productive 
facilities and concentrated in the goods-producing sector. 
This development strategy attempted to maximize growth of 
industry at the expense of development in other areas, for 
example, agriculture and social services. Basic health and 
education were widely provided at an early stage of 
development, but provision of high-level services, for 
example, higher education, sophisticated medical services, 
etc., was subsequently neglected. This heavy-industry 
centered strategy was incompatible with China's factor 
endowment. Unlike the Soviet Union, China was rich in 
manpower, but desperately short of capital and productive 
land. A development strategy focusing on labor-intensive 
industries would have been more appropriate to China's 
factor endowment. But the Chinese leadership adopted a 
Soviet-style development strategy, partly because of the 
prestige of the Soviet Union in the socialist world and
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partly because of their own great power aspirations 
(Naughton 1996, 28).
Under the Chinese command economy the government had 
direct control over raw material flows, manpower, and money. 
Public ownership, in the form of state ownership of large- 
scale industry and commerce and collective ownership of 
agricultural production units, guaranteed state control of 
resources. A planning device was set up to direct resources 
to central planners' priority uses.
Since the objective of pumping resources into heavy and 
military industries was most important, a redistribution 
system was extremely desirable for the Chinese command 
economy. The redistribution system had a unique set of 
macroeconomic characteristics. First, the government share 
of national income was large, while the household share of 
national income modest. Households controlled only 55 
percent of disposable national income in China in 1978 
(Naughton 1996, 31). Second, household saving was small, 
and the bulk of national saving was carried out by state- 
owned enterprises. Third, state investments were mostly 
financed by transferring state enterprise revenue to the 
budget. The taxation system was not explicitly developed, 
but was rather implicit in the price system controlled by 
the government. Fourth, bank lending was restricted to
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short-term finance of trade and inventories. Fifth, 
shortages and lengthy queues for consumer goods were a 
common scene at the time. These shortages were mainly 
caused by the government channeling so many resources into 
heavy and military industries that there was little left for 
households. (Naughton 1996, 31-33).
Major Changes in Economic Policies 
Although the command economy was consistently pursued 
during the pre-reform era, this time period did not lack 
policy shifts in development approaches. The pre-reform era 
can be divided into at least five major subperiods with 
different problems, goals, strategies and policies. They 
are the Period of Reconstruction, the First Five-Year-Plan, 
the Great Leap Forward, the Period of Depression, 
Readjustment, and Recovery, and the Cultural Revolution. 
According to Barry Naughton, "the Chinese government, like 
governments everywhere, made vital economic decisions with 
inadequate information, often in near-crisis situations, and 
subject to numerous economic and non-economic constraints 
(Naughton 1996, 23)." Therefore, Naughton views Chinese 
policymakers as lacking rationality. During the pre-reform 
era, the Chinese pursued quite different strategies at 
different subperiods. Some of Beijing's policy changes were 
the result of a natural process of trial and error; others,
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however, were the result of serious differences within the 
Chinese leadership (Barnett 1976, 1).
The Period of Reconstruction, 1949-1952
In 1949, when the People's Republic of China was 
founded, the new government inherited a badly disrupted, 
imbalanced and underdeveloped economy. Their initial 
objective was simply to restore agricultural and industrial 
production to some sembalance of normal levels. The first 
three years were a period of recovery and reconstruction 
from a war-torn economy. China's new leadership was able to 
achieve their basic recovery goals with remarkable speed and 
success. The existing nationwide transportation and 
communications facilities were reopened. Inflation was 
quickly brought under control, and fiscal and monetary 
stability was restored. According to A. Doak Barnett, 
production in both the cities and the countryside reached 
past peak levels in many.major sectors by 1952 (Barnett 
1976, 2).
The First Five-Year-Plan, 1953-1957
China's First Five-Year-Plan was closely modeled on the 
Soviet approach. The plan gave clear priority to industry 
over agriculture, to heavy capital-goods industries over 
light consumer-goods industries, and to capital-intensive
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enterprises over labor-intensive enterprises. The First 
Five-Year-plan's investment in agriculture was only 8 
percent against 40 percent in industry, 11 percent in 
transportation, and 18 percent in public health, culture and 
education (Farina 1980, 488). Greater emphasis was placed 
on urban than on rural development.
The First Five-Year-Plan regarded the concentration of 
Chinese industry in the coastal regions and in a few big 
cities as unfavorable, both to the economy and to defense. 
Its regional policies were aimed at dispersing industry to 
the interior and finally at overcoming regional inequalities 
between industrialized and non-industrialized provinces. 
Inland provinces, the source of only 27 percent of 
industrial output in 1952, received 55 percent of national 
industrial investment during the first three years of the 
First Five-Year-Plan (Lardy 1980, 174) . Among the 694 major 
industrial projects of the Plan, 472 (68 percent) were 
situated in the interior provinces (Farina 1980, 485-486). 
These projects were concentrated in so-called "key cities" 
rather than evenly spread in the interior. During the First 
Five-Year-Plan, eighteen key cities were selected as 
recipients of enormous investment funds for both 
infrastructure and industrial development. Most of them 
were large cities in the interior. Two hundred complete
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plant projects were constructed with the assistance of the 
Soviet Union and some- Eastern European countries.- These- 
projects formed the core of the First Five-Year-Plan, and 
were heavily concentrated in key cities (Lardy 198-0, 176)-.
In many respects, the First Five-Year-Plan was a great 
success. A highly centralized system of economic planning 
was established. The Plan initiated a rapid growth rate of 
6 to- 8- percent annually (Barnett 197 6, 3)-. In only a few 
years, the Chinese built a- new and much more diverse 
industrial base than it had had- before.
However, the economic problems that had become apparent 
at the end of the First Five-Year-Plan were numerous-. 
Agricultural output was lagging badly. Continuing 
population growth- and internal migration from the 
countryside to the cities resulted in rapid urbanization and 
growing unemployment in the- cities. Mao Zedong and other 
Chinese leaders became increasingly disturbed by what they 
saw as the- undesirable- political and social eonsegu-ence-s- o-f 
following the Soviet model. China's Soviet-style planning 
system, encountered many difficulties, which created serious- 
doubts about the degree o-f centralization. In 1957, a 
fairly extensive- program- o-f fiscal decentralization wa-s- 
adopted. The Chinese government meant to solve the 
unemployment problem- during the- First Plan- period, but it
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failed- and was- compelled to delay this task to the next 
plan.
The- Great- Leap Forward,- 1958-1960
After the. completion of the- socialist transformation of 
industry, agriculture and commerce in 1957, the Chinese 
leadership, especially Mao Zedong, decided to abandon the 
Soviet- model, and to adopt- a new deve-lopment- strategy, In 
order to solve- the problems that- appeared during the- First 
Five-Year-Plan, Beij.ing decided to "walk on two legs", that 
is-, to- spur growth in both agriculture- and industry, and in 
both large-seal e and- sma-11-scale- industry, using both modern 
and indigenous- methods-. This- became- known as the- Great- Leap 
Forward. The policies of the Great Leap Forward included 
People's- Communes, fiscal decentralization, and the 
establishment- of small local industries. The- Maois-t- 
concepts of radical egalitarianism and self-reliance- was 
emphasized during, this period.
The- Great- Leap Forward and the Commune program- 
represented radical at-tempt-s to solve real problems. They 
were intended to provide more economic opportunity 
throughout rural China. Barnett stated it well when he 
wrote, "the regime attempted to do too much, too fast, by 
untested methods; and on balance the effort was a failure 
(Barnett 1976, 4) The planning and statistical system
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broke down. The nation's transport system and economy as a 
whole were badly disrupted. The Communes proved to be 
unworkable,- so did many of the small local industries, such 
as the so-called "backyard steel furnaces". According to 
James Grant, "the effort created some jobs, but only at the 
cost of a lower quality and higher-cost product (Grant 1973, 
15)",
Given the problems and policies of the Great Leap 
Forward and the three subsequent years of bad weather, a 
famine occurred during 1959-1961 when thirty million people- 
starved or died from disease. Moreover, Moscow's withdrawal 
of all of its technicians and economic aid from China in 
1960 crippled many Chinese industries.
Depression, Readjustment-, and Recovery, 1961-1965
The Great Leap Forward was followed by a socialist 
equivalent- of an economic depression. It was not only 
economic stagnation but retrogression as well. Agricultural 
output dropped drastically followed by industrial 
production. Table 1 shows that per capita NMP growth rates 
dropped to about 3 percent for the Eastern, Central, and 
Western Regions, Malnutrition was widespread, and morale 
was extremely low.
To cope with the depression and to stimulate recovery, 
a new development strategy was implemented, focusing on
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Table 1
Growth Rates of Net Material Product3 Per Capita (%)
Eastern Central Western
Region Region Region
First FYPC (1953-1957) 7.12 6.96 10.82
Great Leap Forward and 2.94 3.12 3.72
Readjustment (1958-1965)
Third FYPb (1966-1970) 4.08 3.16 0.-79
Fourth FYPb (1971-1975) 4.79 2.44 2.67
Source: Li 1996, 26.
a Net material product is a surrogate for income.
b FYp refers to Five-Year-■Plan.
immediate problems of economic survival. Some of the 
policies during this period represented compromise between 
the approaches of the First Five-Year-Plan and those of the 
Great Leap Forward, but other policies involved major 
changes in the state's priorities, For the first time, top 
priority was assigned to agriculture. Light industry was 
given second priority, and heave industry, third. The 
military industry, however, continued to receive relatively 
high priority, Although the Chinese continued to stress 
self-reliance because of the Sino-Soviet split, foreign 
trade was expanded with non-socialist countries rather than 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The new policies stimulated recovery and renewed 
growth, China's agricultural production began to turn upward 
after the depression, followed by industrial and overall
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national output- This upward course continued until 1966 
(Barnett 1976, 5).
The famine forced many to move to the cities in search 
of better living conditions. In the cities, food supply 
became difficult and the continuous population increase made 
the housing situation even worse. One of the principal aims 
of this period was removal of rural people from cities to 
countryside.
The Cultural Revolution, 1966-197 6
The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 197 6 is described 
by the Chinese as "ten years of catastrophe". It was 
initiated by Mao Zedong to "revolutionize" China's 
"superstructure" in order to reform China's "culture"
(i.e., the education system, the arts, etc.). In the realm 
of economic policies, the Cultural Revolution "represented 
an attempt to reemphasize the kind of revolutionary values 
that had motivated the Great Leap Forward (Barnett 197 6,
6)". It should be pointed out though, that the Great Leap 
Forward was predominantly an economic movement, whereas the 
Cultural Revolution a political and cultural movement. 
Egalitarian values and revolutionary social change were 
reasserted instead of order, efficiency, or economic growth. 
The years 1966, 1967, and 1968 were referred to as the 
"three bad years", when disruptions of the economy were
greater than the latter part of the Cultural Revolution,
Per capita NMP growth rates remained low (Table 1). The 
widespread political turmoil and the breakdown of authority 
led to a significant drop in production. To cope with the 
ever-increasing urban population and to achieve the goals of 
socialist education, the state council organized a massive 
campaign to resettle urban youth (almost exclusively middle 
school graduates) to rural areas. From 1966 to 1977, 17 
million young people left the cities for the countryside. 
(Farina 1980,- 4 96) . These teenagers were "removed from 
their social environment, alien to the peasant world, 
overwhelmed by hard work and psychologically depressed 
(Farina 1980, 496)". This mass migration, known as the 
"Shang Shan Xia Xiang" (up to the mountains and down to the 
country) movement, had serious social consequences and 
constituted a tragedy for a whole generation of people.
After the three bad years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1968), order was gradually resumed and production 
began to increase. Economic policies after 1968 were 
similar to the policies of the 1963-1965 readjustment 
period. Agriculture remained the top priority. Foreign trade 
expanded. In fact, China imported foreign technology and 
even entire plants from non-socialist countries on a larger 
scale than ever before. Military procurement was greatly
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cut back starting in 1972- after American President Richard 
Nixon's visit to China.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a wave of state- 
supported rural industrialization. Policy at that time- 
encouraged the establishment of "five small" rural 
industries; iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, 
hydroelectric power and farm implements. From a very low 
base, rural industrial output grew rapidly through the 
1970s. Between 197 0 and 197 8, rural industrial employment 
grew 2-0 percent annually (Naughton 1996, 146), employing 
about 17 million people (Farina 1980, 499). Suzanne Paine 
reports that 29 million people, were employed in rural 
industries, which represented 9.4 percent of total rural 
labor force (Paine 1981, 155). However, rural industrial 
output was surprisingly unimportant on the eve of reform.
Of China's total industrial output in 1978, only 9 percent 
was produced in rural areas (Naughton 1996, 144). Thus, the 
sector's direct contribution to national industrial output 
was much less significant than its contribution to 
employment.
Third Front
From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, there was an 
extraordinary episode occurring in China's regional economic 
development history. During the period, there were massive
40
and secret investments and construction in mostly remote, 
mountainous regions of western China, which was called the 
"Third Front". The highly vulnerable coastal cities were 
regarded as the First Front. The Second Front was a vaguely 
defined "buffer zone" between the First Front and the Third 
Front. The basic objective of the Third Front was to build 
a completely self-sufficient and secure industrial base to 
provide China with strategic industrial production in the 
event of foreign attack.
The Third Front program was China's response to a world 
environment that she perceived to be extremely threatening. 
With the increasing hostility between China and the Soviet 
Union and the American escalation of the Vietnam War, China 
found herself without a powerful ally and potentially 
subject to hostile action by either or both super powers. 
Under such circumstances, Mao Zedong, in August 1964, called 
for a drastic acceleration of the inland construction plan, 
based on his assessment that large-scale war was inevitable.
The area of the Third Front includes all of Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, a part of 
Shaanxi (south of the Qinling mountains), and the western, 
mountainous portions of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan (Naughton 
1988, 354). This area (Figure 2) consists of mountains 
above 500 meters in elevation, and basins such as the
Figure 2. The Third Front area of China. FIRST PHASE and SECOND PHASE refer to the first and second phases 
of Third Front construction. Source: Naughton 1988, 354.
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Sichuan Basin. Within this vast region, individual Third 
Front factories were located in extremely remote sites, 
scattered across thousands of square kilometers of the 
generally mountainous terrain. This pattern was summarized 
by the Chinese as "shan, san, dong", which meant "in 
mountains, in dispersion, in caves". It reflected the 
military orientation of the Third Front, and was designed 
to minimize damage from enemy air attack.
Moreover, the Third Front was to establish an 
industrial system with a strong capacity of scientific 
research. Therefore, not only factories but research 
institutes as well were moved to the Third Front area. In 
some cases, entire factories were moved from their coastal 
locations to the interior; but more often only a portion of 
the original plant's work force and machinery was 
transferred inland. In other cases, a large number of 
production facilities were built from scratch. The major 
sectors in the Third Front, where huge investment funds 
were absorbed, included mining, energy production, 
metallurgy (especially iron and steel) , machine building, 
and military hardware. In the absence of navigable 
waterways and adequate highways, more than 5,000 kilometers
43
of railways were constructed using mass human wave 
construction techniques (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 10).
During the seven years of Third Front construction,
29.000 state enterprises were built throughout the region, 
with a huge work force of sixteen million, which accounted 
for almost one-third of the total state payroll in the mid- 
1960s (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 9). The program consists of 
about 1,800 to 2,000 large- and medium-sized enterprises, 
compared with a national total of approximately 5,000 in 
1981 (Naughton 1988, 365; Cannon 1990, 39), and 200 major 
research institutes (Naughton 1990, 365).
The percentage of total national investment that went 
to the Third Front program is shown in Table 2, According 
to Li Zhengquan, within the Third Front area, the south­
western (Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou Provinces) and the 
north-western (Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia) regions 
together received the highest proportion of investment,
35.1 percent and 24 percent during the Third and Fourth 
Five-Year-Plans respectively (Li 1992,53).
A program of such magnitude had no precedent. Never 
before has such a large portion of any nation's industrial 
development effort been directed into defense-related
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Table 2
Percentage of National Investment in Third Front
Year Percentage of National
Investment
1963-1965 38 .2%
Third FYPa, 1966-1970 52.7%
Fourth FYPa, 1971-1975 41.1%
Source: Naughton 1988, 365. 
a FYP refers to Five-Year-Plan.
industrialization. Among its major achievements are: 1) 
the creation of a railway system connecting previously 
isolated parts of inland China; 2) the exploitation of 
important ferrous and non-ferrous minerals; and 3) the 
establishment of some fairly efficient manufacturing 
enterprises in the interior (Naughton 1988, 375).
However, the Third Front program was costly 
industrialization. The Chinese leadership went far beyond 
the creation of sheer military capability, and envisaged a 
massive industrial system fully functional in both war and 
peace. Only about 20 percent of Third Front industrial 
investment went to military industries (Naughton 1988,
373) .
The staggering cost of the Third Front was due to the 
following factors. First,, the nature of the terrain in the 
Third Front area required large expenditures. Second, with
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a maximum speed approach to preparatory work, for example, 
project design and site selection were poor. Nearly every 
known project ran into substantial additional costs 
(Naughton 1988, 376). Third, the Third Front also reduced 
the efficiency of investment in non-Third Front areas. 
According to Naughton's calculation, China's annual 
industrial output is 10-15 percent below what it would have 
been if the Third Front had never been undertaken, and if 
that investment had been used in other inland locations 
(Naughton 1988, 379), It was an unrealistic program that 
could not be completed. The Chinese economy simply did not 
have the resources to complete the huge number of projects. 
Construction of many projects was suspended or terminated 
following the visit of American President Richard Nixon to 
China in 1972, which marked the end of China's strategic 
isolation. In all, the Third Front had a deleterious 
effect on Chinese economy not only because it was extremely 
costly, but because the continuous flow of investment into 
the Third Front projects drained China's supplies of food 
and other consumer goods.
Even though the First Five-Year-Plan and the Third 
Front program similarly placed large investment in interior 
provinces, they differed in goals and locations (Fan 1995,
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422; Naughton 1988, 375). The First Five-Year-Plan was 
meant to promote spatial economic equalities, with 
investment concentrated in a limited number of key cities 
in the interior. The Third Front was more for war planning 
than regional economic planning. Because of the magnitude 
and uniqueness of the Third Front program, some studies 
argue that the Chinese leadership during the pre-reform era 
cared more about military strategy than spatial 
inequalities (Kirkby and Cannon 1989, 4-6; Cannon and 
Jenkins 1990, 28-32) . However, this writer agrees with 
Nicholas Lardy (Lardy 1980, 170-171) and Thomas Lyons 
(Lyons 1991, 471) that spatial equalities were a major 
concern to the Chinese leadership. Egalitarianism was 
consistently advocated and pursued throughout the pre­
reform era, especially during the First Five-Year-Plan, the 
Great-Leap-Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Whether or 
not these policies succeeded in reducing regional economic 
disparities will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Between Mao Zedong's death in September 197 6 and Deng 
Xiaoping's ascendancy to paramount leadership in December 
1978, there was a transitional period. During these two 
years, Deng consolidated his power by purging Hua Guofeng, 
Mao's chosen successor, and the "Gang of Four", a group of
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Deng's political enemies headed by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. 
The time was ripe for Deng Xiaoping to initiate his 
economic reform policy.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE REFORM ERA AFTER 197 8
Changes in the Political and Economic Systems 
At the latter part of the 1970s China's paramount 
leader, Deng Xiaoping, gradually came into power- He 
virtually took Mao's place after Mao's death in 197 6. He 
pushed forward a series of radical policies that are 
generally named the reform and open-door polices. These 
policies have greatly changed China's political and economic 
landscape.
In the political realm, there has been a fundamental 
reinterpretation of socialism in China since reform. In 
December 1978, the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) announced a shift in Party focus to 
modernization and economic growth. This marked the 
beginning of the reform era and rise of pragmatism. In 1978 
the CCP presented its new orthodoxy of socialism— the Theory 
of the Primary Stage of Socialism— at its Thirteenth
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National Congress. This theory was expected to provide an 
explanation of the nature and tasks of "socialism, with 
Chinese characteristics"/ a concept frequently cited by the 
media in the 1980s.
The Theory of the Primary Stage of Socialism has two 
main aspects. The first aspect is that China has already 
established a socialist society which must be preserved. 
China has not only a socialist economic system, which is 
based on public ownership of the means of production, but 
also a socialist political system that has a guiding 
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The second aspect of the 
theory is that China's socialism is in its beginning stage 
in the course of socialist evolution. China adopted 
socialism when it was a semifeudal and semicolonial country 
with a low level of economic development. Hence, it was 
thought that China would not be able to practice initially 
"full socialism" since "full socialism" could only occur in 
a mature socialist society. The concept of "socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics" was thus created as a variation of 
socialism— one that respects China's unique historical 
context (Fan 1995b, 424) . Since poverty is a major 
constraint to the further development of socialism in China, 
the priority at the initial stage of socialism is to bring 
about industrialization and economic growth rather than
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ideological struggle. Other social or political criteria 
are more or less subordinate to economic development. 
Moreover, the Primary Stage Theory maintains that a primary 
stage is unavoidable and may last for a long time. The Great 
Leap Forward and the economic development aspects of the 
Cultural Revolution were unrealistic mistakes based on 
"utopian" views of rapid development beyond China's 
capabilities at that time. Now it is believed that the 
primary stage of socialism will last until the middle of the 
twenty-first century (Mackerras et al. 1994, 11-12).
In the economic realm, the reform era saw China 
gradually growing out of the command system, or "plan" with 
an institutionalized Dual Track System. As part of the 
reform package, the government gave explicit definition to 
two separate spheres of economic activity— the planned 
sector and the market sector. The planned sector was 
required to make transactions at fixed state prices, 
according to compulsory state plans, but its scope was to be 
diminished in absolute terms. The market sector included 
the remainder of the economy, based on market prices, and 
its scope was allowed to grow. Non-state enterprises, 
especially rural industries, were an important part of the 
market sector and almost all their transactions were at 
market prices. On the other hand, state enterprises were
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allowed to operate utilizing both elements of the Dual Track 
System. That is, they could operate according to principles 
and demands of the state plan and also be engaged in 
productive activity in the market sector at market prices. 
After 1985, the participation of state enterprises in the 
market sector has been a crucial component of the growth of 
the market sector (Naughton 1995, 220-221).
The 1990s saw an acceleration of progress toward a free 
market system. At the beginning of 1992, Deng Xiaoping, 
after a tour of South China, reaffirmed reform policies and 
attacked conservative opposition that had emerged since the 
Tiananmen Square incident. In October 1992, the fourteenth 
Party Congress proclaimed that China would adopt a socialist 
market economy. This was the first unambiguous, official 
signal, that the ultimate goal of reform was transition to a 
market economy (Naughton 1996, 289). Substantial 
achievements were made during 1992-93, when, for the first 
time, the government started to cut back on the state plan 
and began to move toward a system of full market pricing. 
Price controls on key producer goods such as coal, oil, and 
steel, as well as important consumer goods, particularly 
grain, began to be removed. By mid-1990s, the end of the 
Dual Track System was in sight because the command plan had 
been sharply cut back and the movement toward market economy
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was inevitable. China now has a market economy with a mixed 
ownership base. Productive enterprises of the traditional 
command economy still exist, but a significant proportion of 
these state enterprises is run at a loss. The future of the 
old state sector is likely to be short and privatization of 
most remaining state enterprises is now under way.
Regional Economic Policy of the Reform Era 
As part of the reform package, regional economic policy 
of the reform era has undergone fundamental changes. Deng 
Xiaoping completely repudiated Mao's egalitarianism and 
advocated policies that allowed some people and some regions 
to get rich first so that they would set examples for others 
that might eventually get rich, too. The Primary Stage 
Theory provides justification for the new regional economic 
policy that emphasizes efficiency over equality. Official 
regional economic policy now expects and tolerates uneven 
regional economic development so long as it improves 
efficiency and produces economic results.
The changes in regional policy reflected painful 
lessons learned from past failures (Zhang 1989, 71). The 
new Chinese leadership believed that the pro-interior 
investment policy carried out in the pre-reform era ignored 
efficiency and in general, failed to bring about improvement
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in people's living standards in general. Even though there 
were ups and downs, the economy as a whole grew rapidly from 
1949 to 1978, particularly in the industrial sector. But 
China's planning system failed to achieve any significant 
improvement in people's living standards during that period. 
One of the reasons why the new leaders turned to radical 
reform was because they wanted to deliver more of the 
benefits of economic growth to the Chinese people in order 
to solidify their newly-secured political position (Naughton 
1996, 61).
The shift in regional economic policy also reflected 
the influence of Western regional economic development 
theories based on the experience of developed countries 
(Zhang 1989, 71-72; Peng 1991, 3-4). The Inverted-U Model 
(Williamson 1965), the Core-Periphery Model (Friedmann 1966, 
60-101), and the notion of Circular and Cumulative Causation 
(Myrdal 1957), all predict an increase in spatial economic 
inequalities during the initial stages of development 
followed by diffusion and regional convergence in later 
stages. Since China is at an early stage in the development 
continuum, an increase in regional economic inequalities is 
inevitable in the short term (Zhang 1989, 71-72) . The 
United States is often cited as a supporting example because 
its economic history of polarization and trickling-down
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ratifies the above contention. Another example is Japan, 
which, as a small country, suffered from decades of 
disparities between the coastal areas and interior locations 
(Zhang 1989, 72).
Growth Pole Theory (Hirschman 1958, 183-201; Richardson 
197 6) has influenced the new urban policy. This theory 
maintains that economic growth initially concentrates in 
selected growth poles before its diffusion to the 
hinterland. Growth Pole Theory helps to legitimize China's 
renewed emphasis on development in medium- and large-sized 
cities and on heavy investments in selected coastal 
locations.
Three-Economic-Region Model
Regional economic policy of the reform era emphasizes 
comparative advantage, regional specialization and division 
of labor (Fan 1995, 425). The idea of comparative advantage 
culminated in China's Seventh Five-Year-Plan (1986-90), 
which divided the country into three large economic regions, 
the economically developed Eastern Region, the less 
developed Central Region and the underdeveloped Western 
Region (Figure 1). The Eastern Region is also called the 
coastal region and includes the twelve coastal provinces and 
municipalities from Liaoning in the north to Hainan in the
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south. The Central Region refers to nine provinces and 
autonomous regions from Heilongjiang to Hunan, and the 
Western Region is the remaining nine provinces and 
autonomous regions in the interior.
The Three-Economic-Region Model is a blueprint for 
regional economic policy of the reform era. The three 
regions were assigned different roles according to their 
factor endowments. The Eastern Region would develop export- 
oriented industrialization and foreign trade. In 
particular, it would upgrade the technology of traditional 
industries and develop high technology industry and high 
value-added consumer products industry. The Central Region 
would focus on energy, raw materials, machinery, electrical 
products, and agriculture. The Western Region would 
specialize in crop agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and transportation. Moreover, the Western Region would 
selectively develop its energy, mineral resources, and local 
processing industries (Yang 1990, 242).
The role assigned to the Eastern Region should be 
understood with regard to the open-door and foreign trade 
policies that have been implemented since 1978. The 
theoretical support for China's foreign trade policy is 
based on the Grand International Cycle Theory. This theory 
states that as developed countries and the newly
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industrialized economies (e.g., Singapore, Korea, Hongkong, 
and Taiwan) move away from labor-intensive industries to 
more sophisticated sectors, China should take advantage of 
its large and cheap labor supply by specializing in labor- 
intensive export-oriented industries. This would bring in 
foreign exchange and capital for infrastructural and 
technological improvement (Fan 1995b, 425).
Export-led growth in the Eastern Region has been 
largely realized through the establishment of a number of 
open zones along the coast (Figure 1). In 1979, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou (all in Guangdong Province) and Xiamen (in 
Fujian Province) were designated as Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs). In 1984, fourteen Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) were 
announced. Within these OCCs, Economic and Technical 
Development Zones (ETDZs) were established for the 
development of high technology industry. In early 1985, the 
Yangtze, Pearl, and Min River Deltas were designated as 
Coastal Economic Development Zones (CEDZs). In 1988, Hainan 
Island became a province as well as the fifth SEZ. In all 
of these locations, foreign investors are given favorable 
tax treatment, for example, tax reduction and tax exemption. 
To promote these zones and cities, the state allocated large 
investment to improve their infrastructure. They became, in 
fact, state-selected growth poles.
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Although SEZs, OCCs, ETDZs, CEDZs differ in details, 
all were designed to attract foreign capital, technology, 
and management skill, and to increase exports (Yang 1990, 
243). In order to achieve this goal, the central government 
designed a series of spatially biased policies, namely, 
"preferential policies", which obviously favored the coastal 
region. The five major preferential policies (Fan 1995b,
426) are as follows:
Revenue Remittance Policy. Some coastal provinces such 
as Guangdong are allowed to retain higher percentages of 
their revenue and remit smaller shares to the state.
Financial Policy. Coastal provinces and open zones 
enjoy greater freedom than the rest of the country in terms 
of currency circulation, credit, issuance of construction 
bonds, and establishment of private financial institutions.
Foreign Exchange Retention Policy. Open zones such as 
SEZs enjoy higher foreign exchange retention rates.
Price Policy. Primary and agricultural goods are 
priced substantially lower market price than finished and 
industrial products. This price differential is called the 
"scissors gap". The scissors gap favors coastal provinces 
at the expense of inland provinces because coastal provinces 
sell high-priced industrial goods to inland provinces and 
obtain low-priced primary products from them.
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Investment Policy. The coastal region receives more 
investment from the state in the form of loans and 
subsidies. Table 3 shows coastal and interior shares of 
total investment in fixed assets over time. Total 
investment in fixed assets includes both investments by 
governments of various levels (central, provincial, 
municipal, etc.) and investments by collectives and private 
businesses. Table 3 also shows that the coastal region's 
share of total investment increased from about 51% in 1981 
to about 56% in 1987, while the interior's share decreased 
from about 49% in 1981 to about 40% in 1987.
Table 3
Percentage of Total Investment in Fixed Assets by Region
Year Coast Interior
1981 50.94 49.16
1982 50.82 49.18
1983 52.85 47.15
1984 52.85 47.15
1985 52.73 47.27
1987 56.12 39.77
Source: Yang 1990, 247 and Zhang 1989, 72.
Another source of investment has come from foreign 
countries through joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. Most of the foreign investment occurred in the
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coastal region, especially in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces 
and the municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin. The 
principal reason for these choices are their geographic 
locations, overseas connections and superior business 
environments over the rest of the country. Table 4 depicts 
per capita foreign investment as a proportion of the 
national average at the municipal, provincial, and 
autonomous region levels. The Eastern Region was obviously 
the leader in attracting foreign investment with a mean 
value more than ten times those of the Central and Western 
regions.
Ladder-Step Theory
While the Three-Economic-Region Model relates to 
regional specialization, the Ladder-Step Theory (Yang 1990, 
244-246; Yang et al. 1988, 43-46) specifies the regional 
preference of economic development. This theory maintains 
that the three macro-regions in China are like steps on a 
ladder and the Eastern Region is the higher step. Because 
the three regions differ considerably in terms of 
infrastructure, capital, technology, management skill and 
economic efficiency, regional policy should focus on 
developing the more advanced Eastern Region by providing it 
with greater amount of capital, energy, and foreign currency
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Table 4
Foreign Investment Per Capita, 198 6-1990 
(National Average=100)
1986 1988 1990
Eastern Region (Mean) 219 224 223
Beijinga 454 786 618
Tianjin3 408 372 185
Hebei 9 6 26
Liaoning 46 102 303
Shanghai3 613 467 409
Jiangsu 19 32 61
Zhejiang 19 41 49
Fujian 163 133 232
Shandong 25 18 45
Guangdong 620 492 505
Guangxib 36 22 24
Central Region (Mean) 20 11 17
Shanxi 4 4 4
Inner Mongolia13 12 7 8
Jilin 73 8 21
Heilongjiang 27 27 22
Anhui 27 17 12
Jiangxi 9 12 16
Henan 4 11 7
Hubei 9 12 29
Hunan 14 3 38
Western Region (Mean) 16 16 12
Sichuan 8 24 10
Guizhou 10 6 6
Yunnan 4 3 5
Shaanxi 55 60 37
Gansu 2 11 1
Ningxiab 0 9 1
Xinjiang*3 30 15 27
Source: Adapted from Fan 1995b, 
a Municipalities 
b Autonomous regions.
433.
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than the Central and Western Regions. Only after the 
Eastern Region has become sufficiently developed, would 
attention be given to the Central Region, and finally the 
lowest step on the ladder would be the Western Region.
The logic for developing the coastal region first is 
that its existing industrial capacity has made it a 
processing center for inland raw materials and an export 
base. In addition, its higher level of technology and 
managerial sophistication will enable it to absorb foreign 
technology. Moreover, the Eastern Region is better suited to 
develop indigenous capabilities for technical and economic 
innovations, which can then be spread throughout the 
economy.
The Ladder-Step Theory is a Chinese version of the 
Inverted-U Model and Growth Pole Theory. It focuses on the 
coastal region, particularly coastal cities, as engines of 
growth, or growth poles, and it contends that future 
diffusion of growth will happen in the interior. However, 
Chinese proponents of the Ladder-Step Theory have rarely 
elaborated on the mechanisms for bringing about diffusion. 
They obviously consider this an issue to be addressed in the 
future. Deng Xiaoping's statement of dealing with the 
regional gap problem by the end of the twentieth century 
seemed to have provided a timeline for some researchers.
CHAPTER FIVE 
REGIONAL INEQUALITIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Regional inequalities of economic development are 
influenced by many factors, such as, geography, climate and 
resource endowment of a region. What is unique regarding 
regional economic inequalities in China is~ that the central 
government has played a more important role in shaping the 
country spatially than governments of other countries. With 
its central economic control and significant investment, the 
Chinese government has been able to direct regional economic 
development and substantially affect the general economic 
well-being of people.
A study of regional economic inequalities in China 
involves the problem of regionalization. China is a vast 
country with an area of 9.6 million square kilometers. As 
such, there are enormous geographical, social and economic 
variations across the nation. Consequently, it is not easy 
to classify China into a few large regions. This study has
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thus far described China as dichotomous with an economically 
developed coastal region and a backward interior region, or 
as tripartite with three large economic regions. Clearly 
though, such a simplified classification conceals 
substantial variations within each region. For example, 
some counties in the relatively wealthy coastal region, less 
than 250 kilometers from Shanghai, are among the poorest in 
the country. On the other hand, some counties in the poor 
interior region, such as Xinjiang Autonomous Region, have 
some of the highest per capita agricultural income (Cannon 
1990, 33). The above macro-regions share certain internal 
characteristics, but one should not assume too much 
similarity within them. Even the thirty administrative 
provinces do not coincide perfectly with natural economic 
regions (Riskin 1987, 225). For the convenience of study, 
"provinces" as used here refer to twenty-two provinces, five 
autonomous regions, and the three municipalities of 
Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. Since relevant data exist 
at the provincial level and national expenditures are 
allocated to each province, the Chinese provinces are in 
fact planning regions. Therefore, this research mainly 
presents regional economic inequalities between provinces.
In addition, some discussion about spatial economic 
inequalities between the three economic regions will be 
presented later in this chapter.
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The term "regional economic inequalities" is ambiguous 
as to what is to be equalized or balanced. In this study, 
focus is on regional income, or provincial income, since 
provinces are the regional units of interest. The best 
indicator of provincial income is gross national product 
(GNP) calculated at the provincial level. Unfortunately, 
early provincial statistical reports in China rarely 
recorded provincial GNP. However, data that have been 
published by provincial authorities on gross value of 
industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO) can be used as a 
surrogate of provincial income. Because GVIAO is the 
largest and the most important component of GNP, it is 
reasonable to use GVIAO data for a preliminary investigation 
of the degree of interprovincial income inequality. In late 
1987, the State Statistical Bureau of China released a 
compendium of provincial income accounts. The most 
important indicator in the accounts is net material product 
(NMP). NMP is the nominal gross value of output minus 
nominal material consumption. It is national income that 
originates in the five "material production sectors": 
agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, and 
commerce. NMP differs from GNP in excluding depreciation, 
and many services that do not contribute directly to 
material production. The value-added measure, NMP, is much 
more desirable than GVIAO as a surrogate of provincial
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income because gross value of output allows double-counting 
to an extent that it varies across sectors and regions and 
over time (Lyons 1991, 473). Provincial output value and 
NMP are used as surrogates of provincial income for 
examining regional income inequality in the pre-reform era. 
For the reform era, provincial output value, NMP, and GNP 
are used.
There are absolute and relative measures of provincial 
income inequality. An example of an absolute measure is the 
range between the highest and lowest provincial income per 
capita. Two most commonly used relative measures are 1) the 
ratio of the highest provincial income per capita to the 
lowest (the high-low ratio), and 2) coefficient of variation 
of provincial income per capita. The coefficient of 
variation is the ratio of the standard deviation of 
provincial per capita income data to its average 
(coefficient of variation = standard deviation/average).
The larger the coefficient of variation, the greater 
provincial income inequality.
Regional Income Inequality in the Pre-Reform Era
Nicholas Lardy's work (Lardy 1980) was the first to 
provide a detailed and systematic account of China's 
regional income inequality (Tsui 1991, 1). He converts the 
officially reported gross value data for industry and
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agriculture output to net values, which actually become a 
form of national income originating in industry and 
agriculture (Table 5). The second column of Table 5 shows 
the sum of per capita value added in industry and 
agriculture by province in 1957, expressed as a proportion 
of the national average. Shanghai, the largest industrial 
center, was almost six times as developed as the national 
average and more than eight times as developed as Henan, one 
of the poorest provinces in 1957. The municipalities of 
Beijing and Tianjin, and the northeastern provinces 
(Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) were also among the most 
developed. Shandong, Fujian, Guangxi, Henan, Sichuan, and 
Guizhou all had per capita value added in industry and 
agriculture of less than 80 percent of the national average.
They were the least developed regions of the country.
Tibet and Ningxia would likely be included among these 
provinces, but data were lacking. When industry and 
agriculture are examined separately, the relatively even 
distribution of agricultural output is very noticeable. 
Except for the three municipalities of Shanghai, Tianjin, 
and Beijing, whose suburban areas had only limited 
cultivated land before 1958, there was little regional 
disparity in agriculture. On the other hand, there was 
striking disparity in the industrial sector. The 
concentration of industrial output in the three
Table 5
Per Capita Output in 1957 (National Average=100)
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Provinces® Industry and 
Agriculture
Industry Agriculture
Coastal Region
Liaoning 200 401 81
Beijing 191 473 21
Tianjin 391 1,101 21
Hebei 93 56 115
Shandong 74 62 82
Jiangsu 86 83 88
Shanghai 587 1, 550 12
Zhejiang 93 78 103
Fujian 79 69 85
Guangdong 95 82 102
Guangxi 74 34 97
Central Region
Heilongjiang 185 219 166
Jilin 132 157 117
Inner Mongolia 115 68 143
Shanxi 97 95 98
Henan 70 29 95
Anhui 80 37 105
Hubei 104 75 122
Jiangxi 90 52 111
Hunan 80 41 103
Western Region
Xinjiang 132 65 171
Gansu 89 36 119
Ningxia b 10 b
Shaanxi 106 58 135
Qinghai 137 40 194
Sichuan 77 56 90
Guizhou 75 30 102
Yunnan 82 48 103
Tibet b 7 b
High-Low Ratios0 8.4:1 51.7:1 13.8:1
Population-Weighted 0.29 0.92 0.19
Coefficients of 
Variation
Source: Lardy 1980, 160-161. Data for Ningxia and Tibet are from Riskin 1987,
226.
a "Provinces" include provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. 
b No data.
° Calculated by this writer, Ningxia and Tibet excluded.
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municipalities and the three northeastern provinces was very 
marked. This pattern is reflected in the coefficient of 
variation for industrial sector ■(■0.92), which was more than 
4 times as high as that for agriculture (0.19).
The above indicates that substantial income inequality 
between provinces did exist in the 1950s, and that 
industrial growth was the major source of regional income 
disparity. China's annual industrial growth between 1952 
and 1974 averaged 12 percent while annual agricultural 
growth was only 3,5 percent (Lardy 1980, 163). Since 
industry was the major cause of interprovincial income 
inequality and was also the most rapidly growing sector, it 
is reasonable to conclude that trends in regional income 
disparity could be largely determined by differences in 
provincial industrial growth (Lardy 1980, 163) .
It should be noted that income disparity in the pre- 
reform China was not reflected in substantial interregional 
variations in real personal income, but in provincial 
transfers to the central government. Because wage rates 
were determined and fixed by the central government, there 
was little variation in urban income throughout the country. 
Through its redistribution mechanism, the central government 
was able to transfer income from wealthy provinces to poor 
ones. For example, Shanghai, Tianjin and the northeastern 
provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning annually remitted to
69
the central government from 50 percent to 90 percent of 
their revenues. The less developed provinces, such as,
Tibet and Xinjiang, generally retained all their revenues 
and received subsidies from the central government from 50 
percent to 80 percent of their own local expenditures (Lardy 
1980, 173) .
Since regional income disparity was largely determined 
by industrial growth, and data on provincial industrial 
growth were more plentiful and complete than data on 
agriculture or services, various studies have focused on the 
industrial sector. Table 6 shows per capita industrial 
output by province in 1952, 1957, and 1974 expressed as a 
proportion of the national average. The provinces are 
arranged in descending order of per capital industrial 
output in 1952. There was a modest trend toward 
equalization of per capita provincial industrial output from 
1952 to 1974. The performance of the poorest provinces in 
1952, generally improved in 1957 and 1974, especially Henan, 
Gansu, Qinghai and Shaanxi, which all experienced high 
growth rates. On the other hand, the wealthy provinces of 
1952 tended to converge toward the national average by 1974, 
especially the three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, and Liaoning, as well as the municipalities of 
Shanghai and Tianjin, which were growing at a relatively 
slow pace. Meanwhile, Beijing enjoyed high growth.
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Per Capita
Table 6
Industrial Output, 
(National Average^
1952, 1957, 
= 100)
1974
Provinces3 1952 1957 1974
Shanghai 1, 864 1, 550 1,303
Tianj in 1,244 1,101 1,057
Beij ing 483 473 632
Liaoning 377 401 297
Heilongj iang 277 219 144
Jilin 166 157 138
Jiangsu 108 83 99
Zhej iang 81 78 59
Guangdong 80 82 88
Shanxi 76 95 73
Shandong 73 62 70
Xinj iang 62 65 48
Hebei 60 56 101
Jiangxi 58 52 51
Hubei 58 75 66
Fuj ian 53 69 57
Inner Mongolia 45 68 98
Sichuan 43 56 38
Shaanxi 42 58 63
Hunan 40 41 45
Qinghai 38 40 59
Gansu 35 35 70
Anhui 35 37 36
Henan 33 29 41
Guangxi 33 34 40
Yunnan 32 48 35
Guizhou 30 30 33
Population- 
Weighted 
Coefficients of 
Variation
1.01 0.92 0.86
Source: Lardy 1980, 164-165.
a "Provinces" include provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities.
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This trend, the poor provinces growing faster than the 
rich ones in the industrial sector, was further confirmed by 
the population-weighted coefficients of variation, which 
declined from 1.01 in 1952 to 0.92 in 1957, and to 0.86 in 
1974.
Carl Riskin's study (Riskin 1987) confirms Lardy's 
finding that there was a modest trend toward equalization of 
per capita industrial output in the pre-reform era. Table 7 
shows that the relative measures of inequality (the high-low 
ratio and the coefficients of variation) were either 
declining from 1957 to 1979, or at least remaining constant. 
However, according to Riskin, the absolute difference 
measured in yuan (Chinese currency), between the highest per 
capita provincial industrial output and the lowest, was 
widening considerably between 1957 and 1979. The gap grew 
from 1,644 yuan in 1957 to over 5,000 yuan in 1979 (Riskin 
1987, 231). This widening of the gap reflects the much 
lower base from which the poorest provinces began. It means 
that despite gradually converging industrial growth rates, 
the absolute gap between rich and poor provinces widened 
considerably from the 1950s to the late 1970s.
It should be pointed out that Riskin's calculations 
(Table 7) are different from Lardy's (Table 5 and 6) due to 
the following. First, Riskin uses gross value of industrial 
output (GVIO), while Lardy converts gross values to value-
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Table 7
Per Capita Industrial Output,
1957, 1965, 1974, 1979 (National Average=100)
Provinces® 1957 1965 1974 1979
Coastal Region
Liaoning 385 334 300 257
Beijing 481 385 617 513
Tianjin 1,112 572 663 498
Hebei 55 86 122 84
Shandong 62 58 77 87
Jiangsu 84 93 113 138
Shanghai 1,517 1, 165 1,404 1,106
Zhejiang 76 72 58 85
Fuj ian 69 56 48 39
Guangdong 84 94 85 79
Guangxi 33 32 37 57
Central Region
Heilongjiang 222 195 127 141
Jilin 161 148 109 120
Inner Mongolia 60 251 187 63
Shanxi 92 b 72 91
Henan 30 41 43 50
Anhui 36 40 36 51
Hubei 74 64 58 86
Jiangxi 54 b 49 51
Hunan 40 41 44 63
Western Region
Xinjiang 82 86 46 54
Gansu 51 87 100 92
Ningxia 10 24 35 80
Shaanxi 56 73 64 80
Qinghai 45 73 99 78
Sichuan 55 53 41 54
Guizhou 33 48 34 36
Yunnan 48 38 32 40
Tibet 7 13 14 11
High-Low Ratios0 152:1 49:1 44:1 31:1
Coefficients of 1.87 1.50 1.72 1.49
Variation
Source: Riskin 1987 
a "Provinces” refer
, 226.
to provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.
No data.
c Tibet is excluded because of uncertainty about its statistics.
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added. Second, when calculating the coefficients of 
variation, Lardy includes the three municipalities in 
their adjacent provinces (Shanghai in Jiangsu, Beijing and 
Tianjin in Hebei), while Riskin treats them similar to 
individual provinces. This explains why Riskin's indices 
are higher than Lardy's. Third, Lardy uses population- 
weighted coefficients of variation (standard deviation 
weighted by provincial populations/average weighted by 
provincial populations), while Riskin uses unweighted 
coefficients of variation (standard deviation/average). If 
regional disparity is the concern, use of unweighted 
coefficient may be more appropriate (Lyon 1991, 475; Zhang 
1992, 19-20). However, existing empirical studies employing 
either measure give very similar results.
The availability of NMP data in 1987 has enabled many 
studies utilizing this better surrogate of GNP. Thomas 
Lyons (Lyons 1991) uses provincial NMP as an indicator of 
regional income and examines interprovincial income 
disparity in China from 1952 to 1987 (Table 8).
Column 1 of Table 8 is arranged in descending order by 
the provinces' initial NMP per capita in 1953. The 
provinces are also classified into three groups on the basis 
of initial levels of NMP per capita in 1953, roughly 
representing the richer provinces (Group 1), the middle- 
income provinces (Group 2), and the poor provinces (Group
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Table 8
Growth Rates of Real Net Material Product (NMP) and Real 
Industrial Net Material Product Per Capita
Provinces3 NMP Growth 
Rate (% per 
annum, 
1952-1987)
Provinces Industrial 
NMP Growth 
Rate (% per 
annum, 
1952-1985)
Group 1 Group 1
Heilongj iang 2.6 Liaoning 5.4
Liaoning 4.2 Heilongj iang 4.7
Jiangsu 6.1 Jiangsu 6.5
Inner Mongolia 2.1 Hebei 6.3
Xinj iang 2.1 Jilin 5.4
Jilin 3.3
Hebei 4.9 Group 2
Guangdong 7.0
Group 2 Fuj ian 7.6
Shanxi 3.5 Xinj iang 4.9
Guangdong 4.1 Inner Mongolia 4.8
Jiangxi 2.6 Shangdong 8.2
Fuj ian 3.4 Shanxi 6.3
Hubei 3.6 Hubei 8.1
Gansu 3.5 Shaanxi 8.2
Shaanxi 4.0
Shandong 4.8 Group 3
Yunnan 5.8
Group 3 Sichuan 7.0
Henan 4.3 Henan 10.4
Hunan 3.9 Hunan 8.1
Yunnan 3.2 Guizhou 6.5
Sichuan 3.7 Gansu 10.1
Guizhou 2.4
China 4.1 China 7.1
Source: Lyons 1991, 484.
3 "Provinces" refer to provinces and autonomous regions. 
The three municipalities are included in their adjacent 
provinces, with Shanghai in Jiangsu, Beijing and Tianjin in 
Hebei.
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3). The grouping is representative of the entire 1952-1957 
period- Column 2 gives the annual average growth rates of 
provincial NMP for the 1952-1987 period. An examination of 
Column 1 and 2 reveals no significant negative correlation 
between the initial level of development as indicated by the 
ordering in Column 1 and the subsequent rates of development 
as indicated by the growth rates in Column 2 (Lyons 1991, 
485). Some of the highest growth rates occurred in Group 1-- 
the rich provinces in 1953 (6.1 percent for Jiangsu with 
Shanghai included, and 4.9 percent for Hebei with Beijing 
and Tianjin included). Among the five poorest provinces in 
Group 3, only one (Henan) grew at a rate higher than the 
national average. The data indicate that over the long term, 
real NMP per capita generally did not grow more rapidly in 
the poor provinces than in the richer ones. This fact 
implies that the absolute income gap between the rich and 
the poor provinces was widening rather than narrowing.
Though NMP per capita is a better indicator of 
provincial income, much of the research concerning regional 
development in China has focused more narrowly on the 
industrial sector, as industrial growth is regarded as the 
major source of regional income inequality in China. In 
Column 3 of Table 8, the provinces are again listed in 
descending order by initial industrial NMP per capita in 
1953, classified into three groups. The grouping is
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representative of the entire 1952-1957 period, and the group 
boundaries are chosen to provide distinct intervals in terms 
of industrial NMP per capita between groups. Column 4 of 
Table 8 gives the annual average growth rates of provincial 
industrial NMP for the 1952-1985 period. According to 
Lyons, there is a negative correlation between initial level 
of industrial NMP per capita as indicated by the ordering in 
Column 3 and subsequent rate of industrialization as 
indicated by the growth rates in Column 4 (Lyons 1991, 485). 
The five provinces in Group 1 with the highest industrial 
NMP per capita in the 1953 all grew below the national 
average while four out of six poorest provinces in Group 3 
grew at or above the national average. According to Lyons 
(Lyons 1991, 486), the six least-industrialized provinces, 
as a group, grew at a higher rate (7.1 percent per annum) 
than the five most industrialized provinces (5.8 percent per 
annum). The nine middle-income provinces (in terms of 
initial level of development in 1953) grew at an 
intermediate rate of 6.6 percent. This confirms Lardy's 
finding based on per capita industrial value-added data that 
less industrialized provinces generally grew at higher rates 
than industrialized provinces in the pre-reform era (Lardy 
1980, 165) .
However, this growth pattern is not significant when 
the difference in initial levels of industrialization are
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taken into consideration. The six poorest provinces were 
almost devoid of industry throughout the 1950s. For the 
entire group, industrial NMP per capita ranged from less 
than 10 yuan in 1952 to only about 18 yuan by 1957. During 
the 1950s, industrial NMP per capita in Liaoning was about 
12 times that in Guizhou or Gansu (Lyons 1991, 486). For 
industrial growth from a near-zero base, an examination of 
absolute increments will be more helpful than the growth 
rates alone. Lyons' estimates on absolute increments in 
provincial industrial NMP per capita from 1952 to 1985 show 
that the less industrialized provinces were not catching up 
with the most industrialized ones (Lyons 1991, 486-487). In 
other words, the absolute gaps did not begin to narrow.
This confirms Riskin's finding, based on absolute 
differences in gross values of per capita industrial output, 
that the absolute income gap was widening during the pre­
reform era (Riskin 1987, 231).
To summarize, Lardy (Lardy 1980), Riskin (Riskin 1987),
and Lyons (Lyons 1991) all agree that the absolute gap 
between rich and poor provinces did not narrow in the pre­
reform era, though poor provinces were growing faster than
rich ones in the industrial sector. Lyons' study (Lyons 
1991) using NMP data from 1952 to 1987, however, is more 
convincing than Lardy's (Lardy 1980) or Risin's (Riskin 
1987) . Lyons is able to trace the long-term trend of
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national income by province, while Lardy and Riskin use 
arbitrary beginning and ending years due to incompleteness 
of earlier data. (Lardy uses data for years 1952, 1957, and 
1974; Riskin uses data for years 1957, 1965, 1974, and 
1979.) Therefore, Lardy's and Riskin's conclusions, based 
on declining coefficients of variation for the selected 
years that the relative spatial inequality in regional 
income was decreasing, cannot be accepted without doubt. 
Lyon's major finding, that relative income disparity 
indicated by NMP per capita was not narrowing over the long 
term, is reached by examining the whole series of data from 
1952 to 1987 instead of selecting arbitrary years. Kai Yuen 
Tsui's study (Tsui 1991), using the same data as Lyon's, 
confirms the latter's finding that neither absolute nor 
relative income disparity narrowed in the pre-reform years 
despite biased regional policy.
Table 9 presents the values of the coefficients of 
variation derived from real per capita NMP and National 
Income utilized (NIU). NIU is the sum of consumption and 
accumulation, including social consumption, private 
consumption and saving. The difference between NIU and NMP 
is theoretically equal to the inflow of resources, or, the 
outflow of resources if it is negative. This difference is 
largely a result of government transfers through the 
redistribution mechanism (Tusi 1991, 4). The two indices in
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Table 9
Coefficients of Variation of Real Provincial Net Material Product 
(NMP) and National Income Utilized (NIU) Per Capita, 1952-1985
Year CVa-NMP CVa-NIU
1952 0.395 0.363
1953 0.443 0.410
1954 0.425 0.367
1955 0.406 0.309
1956 0.433 0.316
1957 0.434 0.348
1958 0.533 0.388
1959 0. 625 0.456
1960 0.687 0.484
1961 0.535 0.465
1962 0.458 0.317
1963 0.477 0.387
1964 0.471 0.386
1965 0.463 0.338
1966 0.480 0.300
1967 0.436 0.326
1968 0.523 0.388
1969 0.571 0.341
1970 0.548 0.307
1971 0.549 0.342
1972 0.553 0.353
1973 0.585 0.380
1974 0. 646 0.422
1975 0. 614 0.413
1976 0.652 0.451
1977 0. 603 0.379
1978 0. 615 0.396
1979 0.605 0.413
1980 0. 600 0.404
1981 0.587 0.420
1982 0.561 0.409
1983 0.554 0.394
1984 0.553 0.431
1985 0.574 0.465
Source: Tsui 1991, 8.
a Coefficient of variation.
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Table 9 measure two different, but related facets of 
regional economic inequalities. The provincial per capita 
NMP is the per capita net value of output produced within a 
province. It is an indicator of regional income. The 
provincial per capital NIU measures the average amount of 
resources actually at the disposal of the residents of a 
province, plus or minus government transfers. It is an 
indicator of the level of consumption.
According to Tsui (Tsui 1991,10), the data for the 
years around the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) are not very 
reliable due to the breakdown of the national statistical 
system at that time. Disregarding the year around the Great 
Leap Forward, the indices do not seem to display any 
significant trend in the period before the mid-1960s (Figure 
3). Compared with the years prior to the Great Leap 
Forward, the levels of the NMP-based coefficient of 
variation are higher in the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s. In the long run, the interprovincial income gap has 
become more pronounced.
The values of coefficients of variation based on per 
capita real NIU are consistently lower than those based on 
per capita real NMP (Figure 3). It suggests that government 
transfers played a critical role in reducing regional income 
disparity. The indices do not exhibit any long-run trend in 
the 1950s and the 1960s. But between 1970 and 1976, there
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Figure 3. Coefficients of variation of real provincial Net Material Product (NMP) and Net Income Utilized 
(NIU) per capita, 1952-1985. CV in the legend refers to coefficient of variation. Source: Tsui 1991, 8.
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is a sustained increase in the NIU-based indices. The 
coefficient of variation increased from 0.307 in 1970 to 
0.451 in 197 6. Though there was a dip in the value of 
coefficient of variation in 1977, the trend was basically 
upward up to 1985. This upward trend, though very mild, 
suggests that despite continuous efforts on the part of the 
central government, interregional transfers did not bring 
about any reduction in regional income inequality over the 
long run (Tsui 1991, 12).
Neither the NIU-based nor the NMP-based coefficients 
of variation display any discernible trend in the 1950s and 
1960s. Though the coefficients of variation peaked during 
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), the reliability of the 
data for this period is hard to assess. The values of the 
coefficient of variation for the 1970s and 1980s are not 
lower than those in the normal years of the 1950s and 
1960s.
To summarize, the absolute inequality of provincial 
income as indicated by per capita industrial output (Riskin 
1987) and NMP (Lyons 1991) widened considerably throughout 
the pre-reform era. In the short run, relative inequality 
seemed to have decreased (Lardy 1980; Riskin 1987), but not 
significantly. Over the long term, relative income
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inequality did not show any sign of a decrease (Lyons 1991; 
Tusi 1991) .
Regional Income Inequality in the Reform Era 
The pro-coast regional policy implemented in the 
reform era, emphasizing efficiency over equality, was 
expected to enlarge the income gap between regions.
Whether regional income inequality has increased depends on 
the scale of analysis. For this study, empirical evidence 
pertaining to regional income inequality between the 
provinces is examined.
Contrary to the expectation, provincial income 
inequality showed a declining trend in the early reform 
era. According to Cindy Fan, whose study is based on per 
capita output data, this trend persisted until 1990 (Fan 
1995b, 428). Yang Weimin also reports that regional income 
inequality as indicated by provincial per capita GNP 
decreased from 1978 to 1989 (Yang 1992, 72). Thomas Lyons 
agrees that the NMP data for 1978-1987 does not suggest 
that the reforms caused an increase in provincial income 
inequality (Lyons 1991, 476-477). Table 10 indicates that 
regional income inequality measured by the coefficient of 
variation of provincial industrial output per capita was 
decreasing throughout the 1980s until early 1990s.
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Table 10
Coefficients of Variation of 
Provincial Industrial Output Per Capita
Year Coefficient of Variation
1979 1.49
1984 1.32
1989 1.03
1992 0.94
1993 1.01
Source: Li 1990,30.
Despite the pro-coast regional policy implemented in 
the 1980s, it seems that total and industrial inequalities 
declined. This paradoxical finding can be explained by the 
variable growth of individual provinces (Table 11).
In 1980 Jiangsu was near the national average, and 
Zhejiang and Guangdong were below the national average 
(Table 11). However, all three exceeded the national 
average by 1990. According to Li Si-Min (Li 1996,36). 
Guangdong's rank of gross value of industrial output per 
capita was sixteen among the twenty-nine provinces in 1979. 
It rose to the seventh in 1989. In fact, Guangdong 
attained the highest provincial GDP by 1990 (Li 1996, 36). 
Moreover, Fujian and Shandong, both below the national 
average in 1980, were rapidly converging to the average.
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Table 11
Total Output Per Capita, 1980--1990 (National Average =100)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Eastern Region (Mean) 162 161 159 156 158 157
Beijing 300 284 291 256 258 256
Tianjin 275 276 264 250 254 258
Hebei 65 63 64 66 70 72
Liaoning 155 149 146 152 152 144
Shanghai 559 528 489 448 411 400
Jiangsu 104 108 119 136 148 143
Zhejiang 83 93 102 118 126 123
Fujian 56 62 64 68 74 77
Shandong 58 69 76 80 89 97
Guangdong 84 89 93 99 109 118
Guangxi 46 49 42 42 42 43
Central Region (Mean) 66 68 69 71 69 69
Shanxi 68 73 78 74 70 73
Inner Mongolia 53 58 58 59 61 63
Jilin 89 87 95 93 96 90
Heilongj iang 109 108 103 106 94 99
Anhui 46 50 54 60 57 54
Jiangxi 56 53 51 54 54 54
Henan 46 46 47 53 54 55
Hubei 68 73 79 83 81 77
Hunan 60 62 59 61 56 55
Western Region (Mean) 53 53 53 55 55 56
Sichuan 46 48 49 52 53 53
Guizhou 30 33 36 35 35 34
Yunnan 39 42 43 41 41 45
Shaanxi 55 55 55 57 57 58
Gansu 58 53 53 57 56 57
Qinghai 75 69 67 68 67 63
Ningxia 61 58 60 64 62 63
Xinjiang 59 63 65 66 72 77
National Average 
(yuan, in 1990 
constant price)
2,277 2, 467 2, 984 3, 446 3,902 3, 978
Source: Fan 1995b, 430.
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On the other hand, the three municipalities of Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Tianjin, and Liaoning Province all experienced 
slow growth. Rapid growth of the above five provinces
within the Eastern Region was offset by slow growth of the
three municipalities and Liaoning in the same region. This 
resulted in decreased income inequality within the Eastern 
Region, which in turn caused provincial income disparity to 
decrease because of this region's larger share of output 
relative to the other two regions. Slow growth of the 
above four provinces was more apparent when considering
industrial output (Table 12).
Table 12
Gross Value of Industrial Output (GVIO) Per Capita 
(National Average=100)
Provinces 1979 1993
Shanghai 1108 480
Beij ing 513 265
Tianj in 498 295
Liaoning 257 169
Source: Li 1996, 37.
Table 13 shows income inequality indicated by GNP per 
capita within the three economic regions. It indicates 
that the most important factor contributing to the 
declining income disparity between provinces in the early
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reform era was the reduced spatial inequalities within the 
Eastern Region and the Central Region. The coefficients of 
variation went down by more than 4 percent annually for the 
Eastern Region, and almost 7 percent for the Central 
Region.
Table 13
Coefficients of Variation of Gross National Product (GNP) 
Per Capita by the Three Economic Regions
Year China Eastern
Region
Central
Region
Western
Region
1978 0.97 0.88 0.43 0.28
1979 0.91 0.86 0.39 0.24
1980 0.90 0.85 0.40 0.22
1981 0.87 0.81 0.38 0.24
1982 0.82 0.77 0.3 6 0.23
1983 0.79 0.74 0.35 0.24
1984 0.76 0.69 0.31 0.22
1985 0.75 0.68 0.25 0.23
1986 0.73 0. 65 0.25 0.24
1987 0.70 0.61 0.23 0.23
1988 0. 68 0.57 0.20 0.24
1989 0.66 0.55 0.20 0.24
Annual Change 
of CVa
-3.47% -4.23% -6.83% -1.43%
Source: Yang 1992, 72. 
a Coefficient of variation.
Two factors led to the decrease in spatial inequality
of GNP per capita within the Eastern Region. One was the
slow growth of the municipalities of Tianjin and Shanghai, 
and Liaoning Province, which had the highest GNP per capita 
in 1978. According to Yang, GNP per capita grew from 1978 
to 1989 by 289 percent, 219 percent, and 219 percent 
respectively for the above three regions, well below the 
national average of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 73). The GNP 
per capita of the most industrialized provinces and 
municipalities in the Eastern Region converged towards the 
mean value of the region during 1978-1989, narrowing the 
gap between the provinces in the Eastern Region. The other 
factor was the high growth that occurred in the least 
industrialized provinces and the provinces with middle- 
level income-in the Eastern Region. The five eastern 
provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and 
Guangdong all had GNP per capita below the national average 
in 1978. But their GNP per capita grew from 1978 to 1989 
by 437 percent, 573 percent, 529 percent, 462 percent, and 
593 percent respectively compared with a national average 
of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 741) . Their rapid growth 
contributed to the decrease in income inequality within the 
Eastern Region.
The decrease in regional income inequality during 
1978-1989 within the Central Region can also be explained
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by two factors. One is the slow growth of previously more 
developed provinces such as Jilin and Heilongjiang, whose 
GNP per capita growth rates, according to Yang Weimin, were 
218 percent and 306 percent respectively during 1978-1989 
compared with a national average of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 
74). The other factor is the high growth of previously 
less developed provinces such as Anhui, Hubei, and Hunan, 
whose GNP per capita grew at 436 percent, 436 percent, and 
406 percent respectively, compared with the national 
average of 380 percent (Yang 1992, 74)..
Thus, relative inequality of provincial income 
surprisingly decreased in the early reform era until the 
early 1990s. This was largely due to slow growth of the 
rich provinces and rapid growth of some of the poor as well 
as middle-income provinces.
Income Inequality between the Three Economic Regions 
The Eastern Region's share of the gross value of 
industrial output (GVIO) was consistently decreasing in the 
1950s and 1960s (Table 14) due to the channeling of 
resources to the interior provinces. From 1965 to the mid- 
1980s, it stayed around 60 percent. In other words, the 
Eastern Region's share of GVIO did not increase immediately 
during the early reform period. It was not until the end
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of the 1980s that it began to go up gradually. The Western 
Region had its largest share of GVIO at the end of the 
1970s. Then it went up and down with a slight downward 
trend. Only the Central Region's share of GVIO exhibited an 
obvious downward trend during the reform era, especially at 
the end of the 1980s.
Table 14
Share of Gross Value of Industrial
1952-1993 (
Output (GVIO) 
%)
by Region,
Year Eastern Central Western
Region Region Region
1952 68.11 22.43 9.46
1957 65.24 23.00 11.76
1965 60.84 27.24 11.91
1970 59.87 27.39 12.74
1979 59.23 27. 64 13.12
1980 60.82 27.54 11.64
1985 60.24 27.18 12.58
1991 63.75 24.52 11.74
1993 67.07 22.34 10.59
Source: Li 1996, 26.
An examination of the growth rates of NMP by the three 
economic regions is presented in Table 15. During the 
First Five-Year-Plan, the Western Region grew fastest, with 
an annual NMP per capita growth rate of 10.82 percent. The 
Eastern and the Central Regions had similar growth rates of
Table 15
Growth Rates of NMP Per Capita (%)
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Eastern
Region
Central
Region
Western
Region
First FYPa (1953-1957) 7 .12 6.96 10. 82
Great Leap Forward and 
Readjustment (1958-1965)
2.94 3.12 3.72
Third FYPa (1966-1970) 4 . 08 3.16 0.79
Fourth FYPa (1971-1975) 4.79 2.44 2. 67
Fifth FYPa (1976-1980) 8.95 7.91 8. 69
Sixth FYPa (1981-1985) 12 . 60 12.14 12.05
Seventh FYPa (1986-1989) 15.13 14.05 14. 68
1989-1991 5.7 6 3.48 6.11
1992 16.35 14.44 15. 01
Source: Li 1996, 26. 
a FYP refers to Five-Year-Plan.
about 7 percent. The failure of the Great Leap Forward 
caused the regional NMP growth rates to plunge to about 3 
percent. The Cultural Revolution and the Third-Front 
program that took- place during The Third and Fourth Five- 
Year-Plan resulted in the relatively low NMP growth rates. 
This again demonstrates the inefficiency of the Third 
Front, which was clearly at the expense of national growth, 
and the disruptive effects of the Cultural Revolution on 
Chinese economy. Even with the pro-interior regional 
economic policy, the Eastern Region still grew faster than 
the Central and Western Regions. During the Third Five-
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Year-Plan, the Western Region's NMP per capita grew at 0.79 
percent, much slower than the Eastern Region (4.08 percent) 
and the Central Region (3.16 percent). During the Fourth 
Five-Year-Plan, the Eastern Region was still apparently in 
the leading position. Its per capita NMP grew at 4.79 
percent compared with 2.67 percent of the Western Region, 
and 2,-44 percent of the Central Region. In the reform era 
(the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Five-Year-Plans), however, 
the three regions showed surprisingly similar NMP growth 
rates until the early 1990s.
Thus, according to Table 14 and Table 15, spatial 
income inequality between the three economic regions 
declined prior to the Third Front activities. It increased 
during the Third Front and the Cultural Revolution. In the 
early reform era, the situation of spatial income 
inequality did not worsen. It was not until the early 
1990s that the Eastern Region began to outgrow the Central 
and the Western Region. Because of incompleteness of data, 
nothing can be said with confidence regarding regional 
income inequality since the early 1990s.
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Empirical evidence examined in Chapter Five indicates 
that neither- absolute nor relative measures of regional 
income inequality declined during the pre-reform era. In 
fact, absolute income inequality widened substantially 
throughout the period, and relative inequality had become 
more pronounced by the end of the pre-reform era.
While major changes were not achieved, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that the pre-reform regional economic 
policy failed. According to Williamson's Inverted-U Model 
(Williamson 1965), one would expect substantial increase in 
regional income disparity in the early years of economic 
development. In China's case, one does not see a clear 
triumph of inequality. If not for the vigorous 
implementation of the interior-oriented regional economic 
policy, there would have been greater polarization in the 
coastal region. The pre-reform regional economic policy
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transferred wealth from rich provinces to poor ones through 
the central government's redistribution function, which, in 
the short term, helped to reduce regional income disparity. 
In the long term, however, it failed to bring about real 
improvement in regional income inequality.
Though the pre-reform regional economic policy was not 
a total failure, it was carried out at an extremely high 
cost, and at the expense of overall growth and efficiency. 
The entire 1949-1978 period saw a respectable growth of 
output, combined with massive waste of the fruits of growth. 
Real Net Material Product per capita grew at about 3 percent 
during 1953-1978 (Naughton 1991, 251). But rapid economic 
growth had not brought substantial benefits to the 
population in terms of consumption, nor had it laid a 
healthy foundation for future growth. On the eve of reform, 
the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse. A 
principal reason for the deterioration of the Chinese 
economy was the massive waste of resources on industrial 
development in inland locations. During the Third Front, 
for example, over a billion yuan was spent on a large-scale 
integrated steel mill at Jiuquan in Gansu Province, a plant 
that finally was able to produce only a modest quantity of 
pig iron {Naughton 1991, 246). By the end of the 1970s, 
Chinese planners were struggling with hundreds of
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unworkable, misdesigned, or incomplete projects. According 
to Barry Naughton's estimate, more than half of the 
additional output created by economic growth between 1953 
and 197 8 was either completely wasted, spent on the 
military, or tied up by the inefficiencies of the economic 
system (Naughton 1991, 248) .
The pre-reform regional economic policy was aimed at 
promoting regional income equality, but was not successful. 
It was able to prevent the escalation of regional income 
disparity, but at a huge cost. The pre-reform regional 
economic policy was to blame for a massive waste of China's 
limited resources, which eroded the Chinese economy. The 
policy left China with more negative than positive legacies.
The pro-coast regional economic policy implemented from 
the end of 1978 through the early 1990s utilized economies 
of agglomeration and stimulated national growth. Real 
national income rose from ah annual average of 6 percent 
during the 1952-1978 period (Linge and Forbes 1990, 1) to 9 
percent from 1979 through 1993 (Naughton 1995, 329). Not 
only did the Eastern Region grow rapidly, but the Central 
and Western Regions grew as well (Table 15). Surprisingly, 
the policy did not cause immediate increase in regional 
income inequality, which actually declined in the early 
reform era (I define the early reform era as the period from
1978 to 1993). This was primarily due to rapid growth in 
previously less developed provinces (Guangdong, Fujian, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, etc) in the Eastern Region, and the slow 
growth of the three municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Tianjin, and the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, and Liaoning--the traditional industrial bases. 
According to Deng Xiaoping, the reform process is highy 
experiemental, just like "crossing the river by groping for 
stones". Reform should start in the provinces of Guangdong 
and Fujian, which are far from the traditional industrial 
bases, but close to Hong Kong and Taiwan because even if the 
experiment failed, the important industrial cities and 
provinces would not be affected. While state and foreign 
investment boosted the economy of Guangdong and Fujian, 
local industrial investment in village and township 
enterprises stimulated the growth of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. 
Meanwhile, the old industrial bases were growing at a 
relatively slow pace due to the lack of investment and the 
obsolescence of traditional industries.
The reduced regional income disparity in the reform era 
in no way implies that the new regional economic policy 
tends to improve the situation of regional economic 
inequalities. Provincial income inequality was likely to 
rise after the early 1990s when the Chinese economy began to
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accelerate toward a free market. The automatic working of 
the market tends to reinforce the existing regional income 
inequality. Moreover, the central government has shifted 
its attention from the southern provinces of Guangdong and 
Fujiang to Shanghai since 1990. Shanghai, with its rich 
experience in finance, trade, industrial development, large 
inflows of state and foreign investments, and quality 
supplies of human resources, has been developing at an 
incredible speed. Though the three northeastern provinces 
are still lagging behind, Shanghai's growth will tend to 
enlarge the development gap between the Eastern Region and 
the Central and Western Regions.
Though no prediction can be made with confidence due to 
the lack of data, it is likely that regional economic 
inequalities will remain a long-term phenomenon in China. 
According to Harry Richardson, spread effects will not be 
created around a growth pole in the early years of its 
implementation, and very long time horizons are needed for a 
successful strategy (Richardson 197 6, 1).
The choice between growth and equality as reflected in 
China's regional economic policy is a result of both 
prevailing development philosophy and politics. The pro­
interior regional economic policy responded to egalitarian 
values and China's perceived needs for national defense.
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The pro-coast regional economic policy was designed to 
replace the pro-interior policy because of the failure of 
the pro-interior policy, the influence of Western 
development theories and experience, and Deng Xiaoping's 
philosophy of uneven regional development.
The pro-coast policy stimulated economic growth, but it 
could not guarantee a harmony of interests among the 
regions. The inland provinces have already voiced their 
discontent by bargaining with the central government for 
more favorable policies, and by prohibiting the outflow of 
raw materials to the Eastern Region. The latter is called 
"economic warlordism" (Jiang 1992; Shen and Dai 1990), or 
"local protectionism", which is a direct spatial outcome of 
the new regional economic policy. Local protectionism is 
highly detrimental to the economy as a whole, and will tend 
to worsen the situation of spatial economic inequalities.
The dissatisfaction expressed by the leaders of the 
inland provinces and continuous ethnic conflicts in the 
border provinces intensified the fear of disintegration of 
the nation. Consequently, the regional economic policy of 
China's Ninth Five-Year-Plan (1995-2000) deviates from that 
in the 1980s and the early 1990s— uneven regional 
development is to be corrected rather than tolerated. 
Narrowing the regional gap of development and promoting
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regional economic coordination constitute one of the nine 
main objectives of the Ninth Five-Year-Plan. The central 
government promises to increase investment in the Central 
and Western Regions. The Ninth Five-Year-Plan no longer 
refers to the three economic regions, but advocates large 
economic regions that are held together by "central cities", 
a Chinese version of growth poles.
The Chinese government has again made a choice between 
growth and equality. The above adjustments to China's 
regional economic policy reflect the prevailing criticisms 
of the pro-coast regional economic policy as well as the 
political complexities of China.
This study evaluates data only until 1993. As is 
obvious, when data for later years become available, it 
would be beneficial to analyze the most recent situation of 
regional income inequality in China. Moreover, a study of 
interregional inequality in consumption will be helpful to 
an overall understanding of regional economic inequalities^ 
Regional consumption inequality is more related to people's 
living standards than regional income inequality already 
examined in this study.
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